The Thesis Committee for Carly Gabrielle Sheridan
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

The Determinants of Jewish Identity in the United States

APPROVED BY
SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:

Supervisor:

Alexander Weinreb

Michael P. Young

The Determinants of Jewish Identity in the United States

by

Carly Gabrielle Sheridan, B.A.

Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2015

Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to the North American Jewish Community. This community continues to hold a significant place in my heart, which is why I embarked on this academic journey to glean more insight into how to make our community a stronger, more identifiable one.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank a few people who helped make this thesis possible. First and foremost, my advisor, Alex Weinreb, whose insight and guidance kept me on the path to success. To all those who helped with other aspects of the project: Rachel Kelmenson, Carmen Gutierrez, Michael Young, and all the Jewish institutions which lent me their datasets. Lastly, I would like to thank my family and loved ones for providing me with endless amounts of support, perspective, and motivation that got me to where I am today.

Abstract

The Determinants of Jewish Identity in the United States

Carly Gabrielle Sheridan, M.A.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2015

Supervisor: Alexander Weinreb

Researchers and religious adherents alike have witnessed decreasing affiliation rates and the rise of the "nones", or Americans who do not affiliate with any religion. The American Jewish Community has become increasingly concerned with the decrease in participation, commitment, and influence the Jewish community has imbued on the Millennial generation of American Jews. Thus, literature on identity and its constructs, geography and religion, and Jewish identity in America are presented. I analyzed data from the 2013 Pew Portrait of Jewish Americans and aggregated institutional data to explore individual-level, spatial, institutional, and religious economy characteristics that determine the strength of Jewish identity in the United States. These variables have their own effects on the four discrete measures of Jewish identity: religious identity, cultural identity, denominational switching, and conversion into and out of Judaism. Crucial findings are specified in congruence with one another, such as Millennials aged 18-39, are the most affected in both positive and negative ways, thus supporting the hypothesis that identity formation is the most formative in adolescence and young adulthood. In addition, going to Israel has a huge positive impact on conversion, religious and cultural

identities, and intermarriage. With regard to intermarriage, there is a negative impact on every measure of identity, although this impact is diminished by visiting Israel. Lastly, the presence of Jewish congregations, and in some cases Jewish schools and camps, increases several measures of Jewish identity, and as such, it can be concluded that at least some institutions have a significant impact on identity. The paper concludes with a final discussion on the possibility for future research and implications for Jewish identity in the United States.

Key Words: Judaism, identity formation, religious identity, cultural identity, denominational switching, conversion into and out of Judaism, Millennials

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Illustrations

INTRODUCTION

For the past few decades in the United States, researchers and religious adherents alike have witnessed decreasing affiliation rates and the rise of the "nones", or Americans who do not affiliate with any religion (Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project 2012; Pew 2014). Mark Chaves of Duke University ascertains that in the United States, "no traditional religious belief or practice has increased in recent decades" (2011). There are several hypotheses attributed to this phenomenon. One reason suggests that the younger, less affiliated generations are supplanting the older, more practicing generations. Alternatively, as fewer people are attending services, survey participants are much more likely to label themselves as disaffiliated (Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project 2012). Perhaps Robert Putnam's work is in action here, attributing this growth to a macro cultural shift in social disengagement (2000).

Regardless of the reasons behind these changes, the Jewish community has also experienced these phenomena. The American Jewish Community has become increasingly concerned with the decrease in participation, commitment, and influence the Jewish community has imbued on the Millennial generation of American Jews, especially since the Pew released a Portrait of Jewish Americans in 2013. The importance of being Jewish in America has declined, with a rise in disaffiliation, especially in younger Jews (A Portrait of Jewish Americans 2013; Rebhun 2004). Furthermore, intermarriage is changing the cultural value of being Jewish in the United States, as intermarriage leads to a decrease in institutional participation, which can be a main reason for younger generations' decreased Jewish identity (A Portrait of Jewish Americans 2013).

In this spirit, this study seeks to identify factors that affect Jewish identity in the United States. This paper adopts a more multidimensional approach-- both conceptually

and empirically-- than past research. From a conceptual standpoint, this paper incorporates four discrete measures of Jewish identity: a religious identity scale, a cultural identity scale, denominational switching within the Jewish framework, and conversion in and out of Judaism entirely. These scales employ the same type of distinctions between cultural and religious identity used by scholars Ira Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Harriet Hartman. However, by incorporating movement from one denomination or religious tradition to another into the analysis, it more effectively captures the multidimensional nature of Jewish identity as it is seen today.

From the empirical perspective, this research uses a wide array of explanatory variables to get to the core of Jewish identity. Aside from the standard set of individual-level characteristics available—especially age, education, region of residence, and having been to Israel—the analysis looks at the effects of parents' intermarriage, proximity to a range of Jewish institutions that are modeled both spatially and hierarchically, and proximity to congregations with other religious traditions. Combining these variables allows me to evaluate more general effects of the religious economy on different types of Jewish identity, and to do so for Jews in different age groups. To the best of my knowledge, up until now, no researcher has taken a conceptual and empirical approach as complex as this.

Interestingly, the tension between religious and cultural identity in Judaism adds an attractive layer to other debates about identity, such as the movement into a religious denomination versus adopting a general cultural identity as "Jewish". This shift is relatively new in Jewish identity, important to explore and understand. No one has yet to examine the relationship between proximity to different types of Jewish instittions on noe hand, and the strength of Jewish religious and cultural identities on the other. Thus, it is important to see if the presence of Jewish institutions in communities can be of direct

impact to identity, and which types of institutions, if any, have this impact. Indeed, for Jews who are concerned with the continuity of Judaism, and others who see this phenomenon or the rise of the "nones" occurring in their religious groups across the country, these notions are sufficient motivators to studying religious identity and its connection with the community. If one's identity impacts one's willingness to participate and affiliate with one's religious or culture group, and participation rates for younger generations are low, then it is crucial to examine factors that can positively impact engagement (A Portrait of Jewish Americans 2013).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Identity and its Constructs

Several frameworks have been developed to explain how an individual's identity is shaped. For the purposes of this thesis, the crucial distinction between them is the relative weight of developmental versus social-structural characteristics.

Frameworks associated with Erik Erikson and James Marcia represent the first of these. Erikson's was the first major contributor to the study of identity formation. He notes that throughout life, conflicts arise in a variety of contexts, and how one resolves them impacts an individual's identity (Grotevant 1987). This "identity versus role confusion" stage occurs predominantly during one's adolescence, and it is during this time that the vast majority of one's identity is shaped, even though it will continually be influenced by external forces. If the adolescent successfully resolves this crisis, then this individual will embody the values and goals that enabled him or her to make that decision, and be propelled to the next stage of identity development, in which the individual develops committed relationships with others (Grotevant 1987). If, however, the individual does not succeed in this stage, then he or she will face confusion about future goals and plans which will inhibit personal growth.

A somewhat different set of theories about identity places more emphasis on a tension between individual and structural factors. Douglas Ezzy posits that rather than focusing on the adolescent age as most crucial for formation, he considers identity to be continuously formed through a narrative script of one's lived experiences (1998). To expand, Ezzy considers a narrative aspect of identity, such that the self is perceived and

portrayed as an amalgamation of autobiographies and past experiences (1998). Indeed, this theory relies heavily on the "social sources of the self-concept" as an individual considers notable experiences, perceived reactions of their actions by others, and situational contexts to meld together into the evaluation of oneself (1998:239).

Likewise, Stryker and Burke also consider lived experience as a contributor to one's identity (2000). In particular, they review the theoretical divide between social structures and internal processes as the main determinants for identity. They suggest that identity formation considers both external and internal forces, and that meaning attributed to individuals' roles and experiences in society truly develops one's sense of self. Equally important, different roles and networks breed distinct identities, and as such, in varying contexts, individuals choose which aspects of their identity they wish to make most salient (Stryker and Burke 2000).

Erving Goffman also considers the interplay between external and internal structures affecting one's identity. In *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life,* he describes how social structures such as scripts, roles, and audiences influence the formation of identity. To expand, there is an "audience" which includes everyone else in society that an individual interacts with (Goffman 1959). An audience observes the performer, the individual, and assesses, interprets, and internalizes the performer's actions while the performer simultaneously continues to shape her impression of self by subconsciously internalizing the responses from the audience. So too, the macro and micro structural relationship is intertwined, such that the script is constructed by the social system, yet it is embodied by the individual and manifests as one's identity (Goffman 1959).

Lastly, Sayers relies most on the social-structural forces of identity formation (1999). He recognizes that humans are social beings that are unable to detach from the

societies, structures, and roles that surround them, and thus there is considerable influence from these forces onto one's personal identity. Indeed, there are some shared aspects of identity that stem from the commonality of certain structures, such as people living in the same nation or community. Yet, these structures only provide a general framework to identity, and the diverse contexts people embed themselves in lead to conflicts between these competing forces (1999). According to Sayers, it is through these conflicts that individual identities develop, albeit still situated in this social and formative context (1999). Thus, according to Sayers, Goffman, Stryker and Burke, social contexts matter, and as such, institutions in these social contexts should influence one's identity.

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS THAT IMPACT IDENTITY

There are more nuanced theories behind the effect of one's life course and age on identity formation. Waterman (1982) agrees with Erikson's theory that identity mostly develops from adolescence through adulthood, with a particular growth stage occurring during college years, or ages 18 to mid-twenties. Similarly, Waterman (1982) and Grotevant (1987) find that college environments are not only diverse in and of themselves, but are very different environments than the individual was accustomed to prior to going away. Thus, moving to college is a significant period of identity exploration.

A related literature addresses identity change during high school years. Waterman (1982) suggests that identity does not change tremendously before these years (1982). Similarly, Phinney and Alipuria (1990) conclude that over half of the Black and White eighth and tenth grade students who participated in their study showed little, if any,

concern or considering of their ethnic identities, thus confirming that conscious formation does not occur for most people until later in life. However, neither Waterman nor Erikson suggest an age range when identity formation stops, rather claiming that identity is strengthened in adulthood but not really changed. In a more recent article, Waterman (1999) introduces a specific cohort mechanism. He argues that although identity does not change much, any change is dependent on the state of society during adolescence, the time of greatest development, and the availability and encouragement to reflect on these changes later in adulthood. Indeed, Waterman suggests that individuals only change, if at all, when they are faced with an opportunity to change and the social contexts that supports and enables that change, or when the older identity is more costly to maintain. Without this supportive context, change in one's identity in adulthood is unlikely. Similarly, Grotevant (1987) notes that life events such as divorce, having a child, and graduation can spark an exploration in one's identity and corresponding values and goals. He suggests that certain identity issues occurring in one stage of life can shape consequent decisions, thus asserting an interdependency between identity issues and choices, regardless of one's age at the time of these issues.

Specific to religious identity, there is also theoretical justification that religious identity formation is developed in large part due to social forces. Some of these influential forces include education, socioeconomic status, age, and religion (Kress and Elias n.d.; Hartman and Hartman 1996a; Hartman and Hartman 1996b; Putnam and Campbell 2010). To enumerate, Hartman and Hartman conclude that a higher socioeconomic status, accounting for education, household income, and housing value, positively correlates to community religious identity (1996a). Age and cohort effects also impact the salience of religious identities, such that older generations have a stronger

sense of communal religious identity whereas younger generations have a stronger private religious identity (Putnam and Campell 2010; Sered 1992).

Furthermore, Kress and Elias suggest that the commitment to one's religious identity is mediated by social forces such as peer group, education, family settings, and "general community religious climate" (n.d.:8). Likewise, meaning found in religion is essential for and contributes to identity formation in one's adolescence (Erikson 1964). Religiosity also provides individuals with a unique setting to explore identity, and contributes to commitment and purposefulness to identity. So too, religious individuals will consciously shape their identity more so than allowing this process to occur without awareness (King 2003; Youniss, McLellan and Yates 1999). Along these lines, youth who view religion as important are more likely to volunteer in their community, resulting in being more engaged citizens (Youniss, McLellan, and Yates 1999). Hartman and Hartman agree with King, suggesting that identifying with religious tradition links individuals to a meaningful and continual history with sustained roots and secured future growth (1999). Therefore, an individual looks to their places in society and links on core meanings and a core culture that tradition, especially religious tradition, provides (Hartman and Hartman 1999).

Lastly, moving also impacts identity formation. Rebhun (1995) identifies a correlation between geographic mobility and Jewish identity. Because of Jews' higher than average socioeconomic status, it gives this group a higher opportunity and likelihood to be mobile, even compared to other whites and controlling for educational moves (Rebhun 1997). However, moving interrupts one's connection to the community present in the original environment, and it takes time to get connected to the new religious community. Geographic mobility can therefore negatively impact Jewish identity, such that moving from one community to another weakens one's Jewish identity (Rebhun

1995). Similarly, Rebhun also found that the longer the length of residence in any one community, the stronger one's communal religious and ethnic Jewish identities (forthcoming).

Geography on Religion

The area where one lives has a major impact on one's identity. To get a better sense of the diverse compositions of communities, there are several key distinctions between urban and rural environments. In their meta-analysis of social capital in both urban and rural communities, Sandra L. Hofferth and John Iceland (1998) point out that families in rural communities mainly consist of older adults and younger children. This contrasts with urban households, which primarily consist of young adults and middle-aged adults. Furthermore, rural communities are more ethnically homogenous in nature, thereby consisting of fewer minority families. On the other hand, cities are hotbeds for immigration of ethnic minorities. These distinctions highlight how the heterogeneity of cities can increase an individual's awareness of other social groups' tastes, religious preferences, and also enhance one's tolerance of these groups (Hofferth and Iceland 1998). Moreover, mean per-capita income levels for people living outside of cities are 33% lower than their city counterparts (Fuguitt 1989, cited in Hofferth and Iceland 1998). Since money affords people the prospect of mobility, city dwellers more so than rural dwellers, have a greater opportunity to move, and thus could be a reason why rural communities are more homogenous (Hofferth and Iceland 1998). It is important to note that these economic and demographic factors are important and can certainly impact an individual's personal development.

Aside from the family, the community is the primary location for social contact, and thus plays a role in developing concepts of association with others and individual expression (Wilkinson 1972, as cited in Summers, 1986). With that said, variances in the structure and characteristics of a community, such as size and ethnic and religious diversity, can influence individuals in different ways. To examine this idea, a psychology experiment (Kashima et al 2004), identified the impact of different-sized cities on a person's development of individual, relational, and collective selves. Kashima's findings show that rural individuals tend to be more interdependent and collectivist whereas urban individuals tend to be more individualistic. These findings can shed light on an individual's predisposition and desire to engage with their greater community.

Religious identification and religious participation are also impacted by where one lives in a more structural way. Roger Finke and Rodney Stark frame this effect in terms of "religious economies," using marketplace terminology to comprehend religious behavior. They contend that urban environments, which have more types of religions, lend themselves to a pluralistic environment that drives these groups into a competitive marketplace (1988). Instead of competing for adherents, however, the marketplace will allow for all types of religions to thrive, as consumers, or adherents, have distinct beliefs, tastes, and ideologies. Thus, consumers of religion no longer need to conform to one model, but can choose from the options afforded to them and will be more actively involved in their religious institutions. Moreover, because of the spectrum of options in the marketplace, institutions themselves need to mobilize more aggressively, or else they will lose membership (Finke and Stark 1988). Finally, the religious economies model also asserts that religious groups with small market position will mobilize more followers and generate participants with increased levels of religious commitment compared to religious majority groups (Finke and Stark 1998). Consequently, the more pluralistic the

marketplace, the more religious mobilization there will be, meaning that people, especially those in the minority group, will have a greater likelihood of religious affiliation compared to monistic environments (Finke and Stark 1998).

Research by Lynn Davidman has reached similar conclusions, albeit in an entirely different context. After interviewing dozens of Jewish women stemming from a variety of backgrounds, she noted that having a wealth of options within the Jewish framework brings "vitality to modern Jewish life" and can "strengthen religious communities" (1991:204). Davidman's findings interestingly corresponds with Finke and Starke's notion that religions' market share impacts their vigor. Indeed, Jews make up a small minority of the greater United States population, thus their minority status could impact their activeness in recruiting members to their institutions. Likewise, some argue that communal affiliation is essential to retaining a sense of Jewish identity, and that institutions made available in the community directly enhance one's participation in the religion (Kivisto and Nefzger 1993; Kress and Elias n.d.). Indeed, Kivisto and Nefzger contend that in areas without sufficient institutions, one has to "work harder" to be a Jew (1993:7). Accordingly, place affects the types of religions that subsist and activeness of participants in these religions (Finke and Stark 1988; Finke and Stark 1998; Silk and Walsh 2008).

Jewish Identity in America

Now that considerable attention has been paid to both (i) identity constructs and (ii) place and space, it is important to consider the combination of the two: Jewish identity in America.

Beginning in the 1880s, with large waves of migration from Eastern Europe, Jews in the United States largely lived in ethnic enclaves bound by religious tradition (Ganz 1956). By the 1950s, however, there was less "social distinctiveness" than in the past, as Jews had climbed the socioeconomic ladder to strive and fit into the American middle-class framework (Ganz 1956:423). Ganz asserts that Jewish identity, or as he defines it, Jewishness, is the reason for the strength of the 1950s Jewish community, but goals of economic success and representations of middle-class lifestyles encumbered Jewish traditional practice (1956).

The 1970s brought with it the biggest shift in both Jewish identity and the Jewish communities, largely because of American politics and world issues occurring at the time. The 1970s was a watershed decade in America. From oil crises to hostages in the Middle East, to the rise of feminism and protests against the Vietnam War on the home front, Americans experienced immense turmoil, change, and insecurity. Given these changes, many Americans turned to religion as a source of stability. Thomas Borstelmann suggests that many religious sects "focused inward", paying respects to the tradition and history of their own groups (2012:110).

By the end of the 1970s, the American Jewish community looked more diverse than it ever had in the past. By 1980 the Jewish population had grown to 5.8 million, around 2.7% of the total U.S. population (Waxman 1981). Whereas the vast majority of Jews used to be concentrated in Northeast cities such as New York and Boston, by 1979 16% of the Jewish population lived in the South and 14% lived in the West, with only 58% still living in the Northeast (Waxman 1981). Not only were Jews moving across the country but many were also moving away from the city centers. This dispersion not only impacted individuals but also the social infrastructure, as new communities needed the support of Jewish institutions such as day schools, temples, and kosher butchers in their

new places of residence. Although for the Reform and unaffiliated, this mobility may have weakened their ties to communal religion, the Orthodox and Conservative individuals who moved benefited from this change, as mobility promoted ethnic participation (Waxman 1981).

Alongside this movement was a change in perception of Jews. Jews saw a decline in anti-Semitism and were considered "almost-white" as a sympathetic reaction to the Holocaust (Schulman 2002). Consequently, Jews moved away from blue-collar and lower ranked white-collar work into managerial and proprietary positions, which enabled them to become more financially successful than ever before, especially compared to other minority groups. Thus, there was less overt and covert anti-Semitism than in the past, which may have reduced the motivation to hide Jewish identity, or even increased the appeal of a Jewish identity for those who were both born within this tradition, and also born on the outside.

With these demographic characteristics in mind, there are a few key reasons for the "Great Awakening" during the 1970s. Jonathan Sarna, one of the leading researchers on Jewish community and identity, notes three main explanations (1982). First, he mentions American Jewry's reaction to liberalism in this decade. The 1960s brought immense radicalism to the social fabric, such as experimentation with drugs, heightened sexuality, and a fascination with Eastern religions, especially amongst youth. In reaction to this liberalism, some sought to reinstate some traditional practices, as a way to hold on to norms that many found more comfortable and sensible. A second explanation for this revival stems from a desire to search for meaning, direction and truth. In this period of uncertainty, many people were drawn to religion and religious figures, those "seemingly resistant to change" (1982:3). Indeed, turning to a religion with deep historical roots could anchor many who felt uneasy about the current conditions. Lastly, this resurgence

of Judaism may be a part of the assimilation/tradition cycle. That is, throughout Jewish history there have been periods of assimilation in secular society and times of turning inward towards strengthening the Jewish community (1982). In the 1960s in America, Jews immersed themselves in the secular society as liberal values of freedom, equality, social justice, and interfaith dialogue coincided with mainstream society. However, as the 1970s brought about tensions with Arab nations in the Middle East, Israeli wars brought anti-Semitism to the forefront, and a national economic crisis made it harder to rely on the government, Jewish values no longer aligned with the liberal values previously enumerated, and as such, Jews turned inward, lending itself to a restructuring and renewal of Jewish identity and community (1982).

Even though all of American Jewry reformed during the 1970s, there were specific changes occurring amongst each religious denomination. To start, the Reform movement was founded in the 1840s as a direct reaction against Orthodoxy, aiming to practice a reformed Judaism in the secular world instead of staying within the religious community (Hyer 1973). Some examples of these changes included some services being held on Sundays instead of the traditional Sabbath day of Saturday, boys being discouraged from wearing kippas, or head coverings, and the introduction of a confirmation ritual for teenagers, sometimes in lieu of a Bar/Bat Mitzvah. During the 1970s, however, as Jews turned toward tradition, the Reform movement was losing membership as it had a "disdain for tradition", especially compared to the other sects (Sarna 1982). Thus, in November 1973, many key Reform and Conservative religious leaders and members met to discuss issues within their movements and strategies to turn its reputation around (Hyer 1973). As a consequence to this and other conferences, the movement garnered a greater respect for traditions and reintroduced some key ones back

into its practice, such as men wearing kippas, a skullcap, and a talit, prayer shawl (Schulman 2002).

Unlike the Reform movement that had a clear mission to dissociate from Orthodox traditions, the Conservative movement started out as a split from Reform in 1913, and served as a middle ground in between the two sects: conserving tradition while working within the secular framework where many Jews found themselves embedded (Hyer 1973). Indeed, Conservative leaders aimed to truly define their movement as its own entity and not just sandwiched vaguely in between the other two denominations. For example, Conservative temples would meet on Saturdays, the customary day of rest, but would have mixed co-ed seating so that families could sit together, unlike traditional Orthodox temples that have separate seating. Some of the most important changes that were implemented during this time included stricter interpretations on religious practice, a strong emphasis on supporting the state of Israel, and expanding the role of women in all aspects of synagogue life, including as Rabbis (Hyer 1973). The movement endeavored to make their goals clear, and even came out with a revised Statement of Principles of Conservative Judaism in 1988 (Ferziger 2012).

The Orthodox movement changed least of all during this time, because while the other movements were striving to connect back to particular types of tradition, even though there were sometimes heated debates about practices in different streams of Orthodoxy, there was also a high degree of consensus (e.g. about liturgy, frequency of prayer and study, and how to keep Shabbat, *kashrut*, and laws of family purity). Indeed, in 1968 Rabbi Joseph H. Lookstein, a prominent New York City Orthodox Rabbi, emphasized the necessity to adhere to Jewish law in everyday life (Ferziger 2012). Furthermore, Rabbi Aaron Kotler, a New Jersey Rabbi, highlighted that learning Torah is the most important thing an individual can do to sustain a Jewish identity (Ferziger

2012). Thus, the already-Orthodox community continued to largely replicate practices associated with preceding generations while other denominations started selectively applying more of this tradition back into their customs.

Although the Orthodox movement did not implement any major changes into its own doctrines, it did need to respond to the growing number of Jewish individuals wishing to tap into the Orthodox lifestyle. To expand, the 1970s saw a huge resurgence of Baale Teshuva, Hebrew for 'one who returns'(Sarna 1982). Some of these individuals wanted to alter their entire lifestyle while others just wanted to learn Jewish topics. Even Bob Dylan became interested in Orthodoxy for a bit and studied at a Yeshiva, a school for Judaic studies (Sarna 1982). Indeed, Sarna calls Baale Teshuva "the most visible component of the contemporary Jewish revival"(1982:31). Rabbi Schneerson, the head of the Chabad Chasidic movement from 1951-1994, stressed the importance of including all kinds of Jewish people in the community regardless if their background was Orthodox or not (Ferziger 2012).

As each denomination reinstated traditional and religious practices in their own way, all of American Jewry collectively transformed with respect to their burgeoning support of Zionism and their relationship to the state of Israel. After the extermination of 6 million Jews during World War II, many Holocaust survivors and other Jews—some of whom had been anti-Zionist in the pre-War years-- established a safe haven from anti-Semitism and persecution by founding Israel in 1948. Even though these new Israelis were hoping for a peaceful refuge, every decade brought new wars over the land with Israel's Arab neighbors such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon (Borstelmann 2012). In 1967, to the world's surprise, Israel defeated all its neighbors in six days. On Yom Kippur 1973, the holiest fast day for Jewish people, Egypt and Syria surprise-attacked

Israel once again and almost defeated the nation. Yet again, the war ended in an Israeli victory (Borstelmann 2012).

These wars, in addition to the 1972 Munich Olympic Games massacre of 11 Israeli Olympians, and the 1976 plane hijack of Israelis that led to a rescue-raid mission in Entebbe, Uganda, ignited American Jews to be supportive of Israel. In 1975, when the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution stating that Zionism was a form of racism, Patrick Moynihan, the United States ambassador at the time, defended Israel by vehemently disagreeing with the UN's resolution (as quoted in Borstelmann 2012:200). Indeed, Moynihan's declaration marked a transition for all Americans; once being anti-Semitic and viewing Jews as passive victims of the Holocaust, now they had respect for Israel for surviving against all odds, as well as towards Israelis as pioneers, no longer just survivors, in rebuilding a new land (Borstelmann 2012). Consequently, Jews became more accepted in political, economic, and cultural centers of power, which may have reduced the motivation for Jews to subdue their Jewish identity, and could have even increased the identity for those born within the tradition. Likewise, Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, head of the organization of Reform Jewish synagogues, said that many American Jews had been "plugged into Israel as if it were a kidney machine, a scientific marvel that ke[pt] them Jewishly alive" (as quoted in Briggs 1982).

Aside from denominational shifts and pro-Israel sentiments, there were several other ways that Jews engaged with this transformation. Sarna notes that, "across the spectrum of Jewish life, new interest in tradition and ritual manifest[ed] itself" (1982:2). Indeed, questions of Jewish identity, the struggles with assimilation, and strategies to reconnect with roots persisted regardless if a Jew belonged to the Reform, Conservative, or Orthodox sect of Judaism (1982). In an effort to engage and educate youth, as well as to maintain the revival spirit, many new initiatives quickly gained in popularity. By 1980,

around 500 Jewish Day Schools flourished across the country (Hyer 1973). Attending Jewish sleep-away summer camps also continued to be popular throughout the 1970s. Although camps ranged in denominational affiliation, location, and size, the vast majority made "Judaism and Jewishness a norm of the camp experience" (Prell n.d.:7). These camps allowed Jewish youth to come together for a few months over the summer to not only socialize amongst their own ethnic group but also connect to Jewish tradition in ways that some may not get exposure to at home or in their school setting.

Interestingly enough, the demand for kosher food has been directly impacted by the rise of religiosity by this baby boomer generation (Prashant et al 2003; Diamond 2002). The WWII generation associated kosher foods with old world tastes, whereby gravitating towards gefilte fish and stuffed cabbage for their meals. Yet, once the baby boomers shopped for themselves, this more affluent generation demanded a wider variety of kosher food products. Moreover, kosher-adherent Jews wanted to "express their upwardly mobile tastes within a religiously permissible framework" (Diamond 2002:491). Even cookbooks recognized this return to keeping kosher, and produced more kosher-friendly recipes (Roth 2010). Additionally, the creation of kosher TV dinners and instant cake mixes enabled this generation to have more flexibility when it came to kosher cooking, which enhanced the overall adoption of these practices (Diamond 2002).

By the 1970s, more gourmet kosher foods and experiences were in demand, and kosher wine production expanded beyond the sweet taste of Manicheweitz, which resulted in wineries winning several awards. Indeed, by 1994, kosher wine sales were up to 365,000 cases per year (Diamond 2002). Similarly, by the 1980s, kosher hotels and cruise lines were created to give the kosher consumer an opportunity to live luxuriously while still adhering to their religious practices (Diamond 2002).

Throughout the 1970s, American Jews experienced changes across many fronts. Each denomination was affected by the instability permeating American society during this decade and responded in its own way. As described above, the Reform movement reintroduced practices that were previously abandoned, the Conservative movement made strides towards defining their role in the community, and Orthodoxy excitedly embraced the individuals who wanted to reconnect to the traditions they held dear (Ferziger 2012). Most importantly, however, Jews transcended their denominations as they were able to unite in terms of their attitudes towards Israel and their general support of Zionism. American Jews not only provided financial and philosophical support, but thousands of Jews visited and moved to Israel to connect with their Jewish homeland (O'Neil 1980). Indeed, the 1970s Jewish revival enabled individuals and denominations alike to strengthen their Jewish identity in various ways, with an underlying appreciation for the traditions laid forth in Jewish texts and history.

This renewal has affected the American Jewish community today. The 2013 Pew Portrait of Jewish Americans Survey (described in greater detail below) indicated that the Baby Boomer generation--- those that lived through the 1970s and born between 1946 and 1964-- still strongly identify with Judaism (2013). To elaborate, 81% of these Jews consider themselves Jews by religion, and only 19% consider themselves Jews of no religion, indicating that the vast majority of this Jewish cohort still identifies with the traditions they were socialized into forty years prior.

In contrast, overall levels of engagement are much lower for the younger generation. The Millennial generation, born after 1980, does not associate with Judaism in a religious sense nearly as much as the baby boomers (A Portrait of Jewish Americans 2013). Only 68% consider themselves Jews by religion and 32% consider themselves Jews of no religion. This is consistent with other research. Rebhun compared Jewish

identification from 1970 to 1990 and concluded that although intermittent and home-bound traditions have been quite stable over time, persistent and communal religious behavior has dramatically declined (2004). Comparatively, in 2012, Ukeles compared four active, long-established, and large Jewish Communities-- Chicago, Baltimore, New York, and Cleveland-- and concluded that in these communities there is a strong overall engagement in Judaism, yet with important group exceptions such as Jews who identify as no religion, those who have intermarried, and non-Orthodox young adults (2012). These findings illustrate the demographic strength of the Orthodox community, as they are not only growing in size but are also remaining active participants in the community (Ukeles 2012). Additionally, Ukeles finds that there are a growing number of Jewish families living in poverty, and the high cost of belonging to Jewish institutions hinders the engagement opportunities of Jews in poverty and young adults (2012). Congruently, a 2013 study found a lack of engagement by young adults in all religious or traditionally Jewish institutions, with only a small number belonging to a temple or going to services (Shain et. al. 2013).

What this study also found, however, is an emergence of "Do it Yourself" Judaism by a small segment of the young adult population. Forty-two percent of the roughly 1,300 sample engaged in DIY Judaism, whereby participating in "home-based or self-organized ritual practice and small, niche initiatives" such as hosting a Shabbat dinner or holiday party (Shain et. al. 2013:15). Those with no Jewish background do not even engage on this organic level, but those with somewhat of a Jewish background participated the most in DIY Judaism. In contrast, Jews who identify with a stronger background do activities that extend beyond DIY Judaism.

There are few key factors that affect this low level of engagement and weakened sense of Jewish identity. Most importantly, an examination of the Pew data reveals that

there have been major shifts in denominational affiliation over time, which bears with it some unique implications. More than 50% of Conservative Jews move to some other stream of Judaism at one point in their lives. Specifically, in 1971, 41% of Jews aged less than 30 identified as Conservative compared to only 11% of Jews under thirty today (A Portrait of Jewish Americans 2013; Gordis 2014). Around 60% of Orthodox, Reform, and Secular/Cultural groups remain in the same stream as their childhood affiliation (own calculation). Hartman and Hartman also discovered a very similar movement (1999). They assert that for individuals who move from a less traditional denomination to a more traditional one, perhaps from Reform to Orthodoxy, there will be a rededication effect to the movement and the individual's religious and ethnic identities will get stronger (1999). In contrast, those who go from a more traditional background to a less traditional one will retain an influence from their previous denomination, and will more strongly identify with Judaism than their counterparts in this new stream (Hartman and Hartman 1999). Finally, Sands, Marcus, and Danzig discovered that a lower level of Jewish background, trips to Israel, levels of organizational affiliation, and higher levels of spirituality are associated with moving to more traditional denominations (2006). In addition, being previously married, having a child in one's home, and living in the Western region of the United States also contribute to moving to more traditional denominations. In contrast, a higher level of Jewish background, fewer trips to Israel, and lower level of spirituality are associated with moving to a less traditional denomination (Sands, Marcus, Danzig 2006). Furthermore, they found that individuals who are older, women, and living in the South or Midwest, makes one more likely to move to less traditional denominations. Clearly, the conversion and denominational switching phenomenon occurs in all directions and across all groups of Judaism.

One theory behind these shifts is that, as individuals age, they adopt different types of identities, specifically from religious to cultural. Over time, Jewish identity has shifted from focusing mainly on religious traditions to integrating ethnic and cultural measures into this framework. Indeed, many American Jews solely identify with the ethnic identity that ties in Jewish history and ancestry together (Friedlander et. al. 2010). Ganz's study on Jews in the 1950s notes this symbolic ethnicity, theorizing that Jews will weaken their attachment and behaviors towards religion and instead identify with the symbols of Judaism, only passively engaging in the religion (Ganz 1956). He believed that, like immigrants, Jews will shed this religious identity and connect to other ethnic identities in America, resulting in a lack of actual effort made to maintain Judaism. Fifty years later, Hartman and Hartman acknowledge that part of this phenomenon still exists, whereby Jews acknowledge ethnic, historic, and cultural components of identity in addition to religion, which leads to the nuanced expression of Jewish identity in both the public and private domains (2009). Likewise, Kivisto and Nefzger(1993) have connected ethnic and religious identities together, noting the uniqueness Jews to connect to a religion and ethnicity, especially compared to other white groups. Thus, they note that Jewish identity may have changed "qualitatively, not quantitatively", such that Jews are redefining the various identities one can develop in regards to Judaism (*ibid* p.6).

Although a change in identity typology as well as denominational shifts have contributed to decreased levels of engagement, the rise of intermarriage undoubtedly plays a role in this phenomenon. The Pew study revealed that only 59% of children with intermarried parents ages 18-29 identify with Judaism, and it is projected that 83% of this same group who chooses to marry will wind up marrying non-Jews (2013). This group is also half as likely to be involved in the Jewish community, raise Jewish children, identify with Israel, or affiliate with a Jewish denomination compared to people with two Jewish

parents (A Portrait of Jewish Americans 2013). Similarly, intermarriage has shifted Jewish identity entirely, such that affiliation is now seen as a choice (Friedlander et. al. 2010). Because intermarried couples have two religious identities at play, people are identifying with Judaism as they see fit, and disregarding the traditional notion that either matriline or conversion are the necessary determinants of a Jewish identity. Thus, because intermarriages breeds more acceptance of outgroups and weakens prejudices and stereotypes, this could lead to someone choosing to identify with outgroups they may have been less likely to want to identify with before marriage (Kalmijn 1998).

Along these lines, intermarried relationships have a higher level of divorce than in-marriage relationships (Lehrer and Chiswick 1993). With the exception of couples with no religious identification, people who identify with the same religions have more stable and long relationships, and relationships are hindered when partners need to look elsewhere for religious intimacy (Lehrer and Chiswick 1993). However, marriage scholars have noted that individuals endogamous and homogamous, marrying people within their group and with the same status, respectively (Kalmijn 1998). Jews, on average, are less likely to divorce than other populations, and thus, intermarriages within the Jewish population are also less likely to get divorced, despite their mismatched identities (Rebhun 2004b, Lehrer and Chiswick 1993). One explanation to this is that non-Jews who live with Jews are more likely to honor the Jewish faith and be engaged in Jewish rituals and ceremonies, even if they maintain their own religious faith (Rebhun 2004b). However, despite this engagement, Jewish intermarried couples are still less likely to raise their children Jewish and participate in the Jewish community.

Beyond familial composition, research has identified two factors, the importance of communal institutions and home-bound rituals, which affect Jewish identity. Participating in Jewish institutions has undoubtedly been linked to an increased Jewish

identity. Kivitso and Nefzger's research concluded that the importance of being Jewish has a significantly positive correlation to Jewish behaviors and participation (1993). Likewise, participating in life transitions with and through the community, such as Bar and Bat Mitzvahs at a temple or "sitting *Shiva*" (a ritualized period of mourning after the death of a close family member), and having visitors inextricably links Jewish identity to the community (King 2003). Several studies have noted that youth group participation has been positively linked with ritual observance, in-marriage, and involvement and membership in Jewish institutions and the Jewish people (Cohen and Ganapol 1998; Hartman and Hartman 2003; Baker and Ukeles 1994). Steven M. Cohen concludes that Jewish education leads to having more Jewish friends later in life, and that a Jewish identity is associated with having more religious and social Jewish contacts (Cohen 2007; Amyot and Sigelman 1996). Furthermore, the more Jewish education a child has, the stronger their Jewish identity will be as adults, resulting in a higher rate of in-marriage as well (Cohen 2007). However, interestingly enough, attending Sunday school or part-time Jewish school does not have an effect on a child unless Jewish norms taught in school are enforced at home (Cohen 1974). Second only to attending Jewish day schools, trips to Israel have the strongest long-term impact on Jewish identity (Cohen 2007). Most importantly, Kress and Elias found that the level of commitment to Judaism for students in their study depended on the number of Jewish communal contexts as well as family and home-bound rituals that the student participated in (n.d.).

We understand the importance of participating in Jewish institutions on Jewish identity, but how is that identity affected by the mere presence of different types of Jewish institutions? This has yet to be analyzed (Kress and Elias n.d.). Herein lies one of the key motivations for the present study. While paying heed to the effects of religious economies in general and intermarriage, I pose several questions on the role of Jewish

institutions on different aspects of Jewish identity. How does the number of Jewish institutions in one's community affect identity formation? Does this affect one's religious and cultural identities in different stages of one's life, or is identity fully formed in adolescent and young adulthood like the previous research suggests? How has having intermarried parents impacted an individual's identity if this individual lives in areas with Jewish institutions? Taken altogether, how is reported Jewish identity affected by institutions, especially in combination with other indices of identity, such as the presence of other religious institutions in the area, age, intermarriage, having visited Israel, and most importantly, the measured effect on identity when spatial models are specified.

PRELIMINARY IMPRESSIONS: NLSY AND GSS

For a preliminary glimpse of trends in Jewish identity in the U.S., I drew on Jewish samples from two nationally representative datasets: the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY 1979 and 1997), and the General Social Survey (GSS) .

At first glance, the NLSY dataset is advantageous because it follows the same people over time, which affords researchers the opportunity to examine change in one's lifetime, instead of generalizing trends across repeated cross-sectional samples, as is the case with the GSS. Additionally, the target age range for the NLSY at the baseline is 14-22, which is a salient age for identity formation in some frameworks, and thus, we can measure trends for youth in their teens and twenties (Erikson 1982; Phinney and Alipuria 1990; Waterman 1999). Interestingly, both models note that there is as much movement from a Jewish religious identity to another religious identity in the early years (1979-82) that data was collected as in the following 18 years (1982-2000). This finding strengthens

the claim that it is important to focus on adolescents and young adults, as these shifts in identity are occurring in significant levels during these ages.

For our purposes, however, there are serious problems with the NLSY. One is related to available questions. Respondents were only asked a question on religious identity in 1979, 1982, and 2000 (see Figure 1). There is therefore no way to identify cultural identity, let alone qualitative measures of different types of identity (e.g. strength of affiliation). Another, problem is sample size and attrition. Of 117 Jewish participants in the 1979 baseline—already a small sample-- 51 were lost to attrition by 1980, and among those followed, a little less than 80% of those who claimed to have been raised Jewish still identified as Jewish, 12% claimed no religious identity, and 8% were associated with other religious traditions by the year 2000. People raised as Jews are less likely to fall out of the study than other participants in the sample. However, because we cannot measure these 51 Jewish people in 2000, it is unclear whether they are more likely to have explored other religious identities or if they did in fact retain their Jewish identity.



Figure 1: Religious Identity in NLSY 1979 Jewish Sample

Preliminary glimpse of trends can also be found in the 1997 NLSY panel. Although this sample is also limited, it asked respondents to name their denominational affiliation, allowing me to identify patterns of movement between different Jewish denominations. Of the 77 respondents in the 1997 NLSY sample who reported their childhood religion as Jewish, there are 22 respondents who identify with the Orthodox movement. By 2004 and 2011, 8 out of the 15 remaining participants reported an Orthodox affiliation, the largest affiliation identity. For Conservative denominational affiliation, there were 14 respondents in 1999, there were 6 in 2004 (out of 11, 3 were lost to sample attrition), and there were no Conservative respondents by 2011, (out of 4, as 10 participants were lost to sample attrition). Lastly, in 1999 there were 28 Reform respondents, and by 2004 there were 7 (14 lost to sample attrition), and by 2011 there were 4 Reform respondents out of the remaining 13 (another 15 lost to sample attrition).

Assuming that respondents lost to attrition had generally similar patterns of switching, these trends confirm the magnitude of movement between denominations over time. There are stronger signs of retention within Orthodoxy compared with the other denominations, which stayed consistent from 2004 to 2011. This is consistent with the literature that Orthodox adherents are less likely to switch denominations than other streams of Judaism (Ukeles 2012; see Figure 1). An interesting age pattern also emerges strongly in these data. The largest shifts across denominations occur from 1999 to 2004. This is strinkingly parallel to patterns found in the 1979 NLSY panel. It confirms that identities change more at an earlier age than an older one, so as these respondents get older, they are more likely to remain in the same denomination.

Altogether, the NLSY data supports the notions that Jewish identity is shifting both between and within groups, especially for younger people. However, this dataset has such a small sample that it hinders the generalizability of these findings. Furthermore, identity questions in this sample do not differentiate between religious and cultural measures, sample sizes restrict robust analysis of shifting from one stream or denomination to another, or from one religious tradition to another.

General Social Survey (GSS) data allow me to parse out any aspects of Jewish identity in a somewhat different way. Respondents in this repeated cross-sectional sample were asked a question on religious identity in most years of the survey: 1982, 1983, 1985-1991, 1993-2012. They are also drawn from a much broader age range, allowing me to test the idea—related to identity formation theory reviewed above—that identity changes are more likely in late adolescence/early adulthood. Lastly, the GSS is beneficial in that it is a nationally representative sample, and can better suggest trends on a population level instead of an individual level such as the NLSY.

Out of the 1,025 people in the pooled GSS sample who were raised Jewish at age 16 and currently identify as Jewish in the GSS sample, a slight shift can be seen with regard to Jewish identity across the United States. Within this sample, there has been a 15-20% disaffiliation rate with Judaism, with the greatest disaffiliation rate (20%) occurring in the years 2000-2006. This means that, over time, roughly 160 people from the sample have disaffiliated with Judaism. Of these people, nearly twice as many (N= 102) who were raised Jewish have chosen to disaffiliate from any religion whatsoever, compared to people who were raised Jewish (N=60) who have affiliated, or converted, to another religion. I also grouped the respondents by age: those less than 40, those aged between 40-59, and those above 60. This data suggests that the greatest disaffiliation rates occur amongst the youngest age group and the lowest disaffiliation rate is amongst

the oldest age group. This is broadly consistent with past research that points to Jews under 40 as the critical targets for shifting identity.

Taken together, therefore, both the NLSY and GSS show that there is movement across denominations, and a decline in self-identifying as Jewish. Although this shift is important, this data cannot parse out important details, such as why identity is changing, what type of people are changing, at what point in life stages Jewish identity changes the most, and which aspects of identity-- cultural or religious-- change the most. Furthermore, even in the NLSY sample, questions about identity were solely religious in nature (i.e. attending services and hours spent volunteering and participating in religious organizations), so it failed to capture a more nuanced approach to Jewish identity which includes cultural measures.

It is important to note, however, that these denominational shifts, as seen in this preliminary data analyses, must not be examined in a Jewish bubble. Jewish Americans are operating in a religious marketplace, as communities across the country boast a wide range of religious institutions and practices. Thus, Jewish identity cannot only be defined by one's label or identity with a particular Jewish denomination, but rather as a product of what other religious opportunities, identities, and labels are available in the greater community that an individual lives in.

Indeed, the United States is unlike most other Western nations when it comes to religious freedom. Unlike in Europe, where a national church tends to dominate the local religious economy, the United States is intentionally heterogeneous in terms of religion. Furthermore, the value placed on multiculturalism, and the prolific mix of religions in communities, especially urban ones, makes possible the ability to access other groups and promote a central legitimacy of religious choice. This ideology enables religious shifts-- both inter-denominational as well as across religions-- to be acceptable, because there are

a range of choices unlike before and particular to the United States. Likewise, by coming into contact with these groups and peoples within them, it is easy for intermarriage to occur.

Consequently, Jewish identity in the U.S. relies heavily on the general religious marketplace, or the religious economy, that Jews are embedded within, as a contributing factor not only to shifts in identity but also to increased levels of intermarriage over time. This idea of religious economy is a contributing factor to justify the examination of the effect of religious community institutions, both Jewish and non-Jewish, on one's religious and cultural Jewish identities. As described below, I do this by pairing data on Jewish institutions and the general (i.e., non-Jewish) religious economy with individual-level data from the 2013 Pew Portrait of Jewish Americans (PPJA) sample. This generates a much larger and generalizable sample of Jews across the United States that includes multiple measures of identity.

Thus, these datasets are merely a baseline for further analysis that will be conducted in the Pew dataset. Indeed, to get a better measure of Jewish identity that measures both religious and cultural indicators, the Pew, conducted in 2013, which captures roughly 5,100 participants, is a more robust dataset to rely on to delve into the nuances of Jewish identity on a generalizable level.

PEW DATASET

Descriptive Statistics

The PPJA survey, fielded in 2013, includes 5,153 respondents who either self-identify as Jews now, or as having been raised with at least one Jewish parent. Table 1 presents some basic sociodemographic information about this sample. Gender is evenly distributed, with males representing 49.3% (n=2,542) and females representing 50.7% (n= 2,611). The mean age for the sample is 54.5 years old, with a range from 18 years old to 95 years old. Approximately 60% of the sample is married, 5% is living with a partner, 10% is divorced or separated, and 16% has never been married. Regarding education, around 65% of the sample has either an undergraduate and/or graduate degree, 20% has completed some college, and 14.5% has completed high school or less. Twenty-one percent of the sample earns over $150,000 a year, 33% earns between $75-150,000 a year, 22% earns between $40-75,000, and around the same, 23%, earns less than $40,000. Two variables are not as evenly distributed: regions where participants live and visiting Israel. Roughly 54% of the sample resides on the East Coast, 20% live in the South, 16% live in the West, and only 10% live in the Midwest. With regard to Israel, 55% of the sample has never visited Israel before, close to 18% has visited once, 26% has visited more than once, and only 1% of the sample has lived in Israel.

Demographic Variables	Frequency	Percent	Total Frequency
Age Groups			
18-39	1,219	23.66	
40-59	1,822	35.36	
60-69	1,052	20.42	
70-95	1,060	20.57	**5,153**
Education			
HS or less	747	14.50	
Some college	1,056	20.49	
Undergraduate degree	2,067	40.11	
Graduate degree	1,283	24.90	**5,153**
Annual Income	1,209	23.46	
<$40K	1,143	22.18	
$40-75K	1,705	33.09	
$75-150K	1,096	21.27	
>$150K			**5,153**
Region			
East	2,803	54.40	
Midwest	508	9.86	
South	1,013	19.66	
West	829	16.09	**5,153**
Visited Israel			
Never Been to Israel	2,848	55.27	
Visited Once	924	17.93	
Visited > Once	1,328	25.77	
Lived in Israel	53	1.03	**5,153**

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Measures

In order to tap into the nuances of Jewish identity within the Pew dataset, I created two different scales to capture both religious and cultural aspects of Jewish

behavior and attitudes. These scales are modeled after Ira Sheskin and Arnold Dashefskys' 2011 Report on Jewish Population in the United States, and Harriet Hartman's 2014 Berman Jewish DataBank Learning Module - Exploring Jewish Identity. Additional indicators of identity are denominational switching within Judaism and conversion into and out of Judaism.

RELIGIOUS SCALE

Using the following items in the Pew dataset, I generated an additive scale that represents religious Jewish identity. The scale ranges from 0-16, where 16 indexes greater religiosity (this required reverse coding of some of the variables):

1. On observing Jewish Law:
    a. 'q.E5c' - Please tell me how important each of the following is to what being Jewish means to you observing Jewish law
    b. 'q.H10' - How often, if at all, does anyone in your household light Sabbath candles on Friday night?
    c. '*q.H11a*' - Do you keep kosher in your home
    d. '*q.H11b*' - Do you personally refrain from handling or spending money on the Jewish Sabbath
    e. *'q.H11c*' - Last Passover, did you hold or attend a Seder or not?
    f. *'q.H12*' - During the last Yom Kippur did you fast?
    g. '*attend1*'- Aside from special occasions like weddings, funerals and bar mitzvahs, how often do you attend Jewish religious services at a synagogue, temple, minyan or Havurah ?
    h. '*q.H6*' - Do you believe in God or a universal spirit or not ?

2. On self-identification
    a. '*q.H5a*' - How important is religion in your life: very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?
3. On determining what it means to be Jewish
    a. a.*'q.E 6d*' - In your opinion, can a person be Jewish if they believe that Jesus was the messiah?

CULTURAL SCALE

To look at cultural Jewish identity, I followed the same procedures, this time using the following measures in the Pew dataset. Here, too, the final scale ranges from 0-16:

1. On self-identification:
    a. '*finalqa4*'- Aside from religion, do you consider yourself Jewish or partially Jewish, or not?
    b. *'h5b*' - How important is being Jewish in your life: very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?
    c. *'q.E 9a*' - Please tell me if you agree or disagree: I am proud to be Jewish
    d. *'q.E 9b*' - Please tell me if you agree or disagree: I have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people
2. On Hebrew:
    a. '*q.E7a-c*' Do you know the Hebrew alphabet, can you read Hebrew, can you converse in Hebrew?
3. On determining what it means to be Jewish (seven items):

a. '*q.E5a-i'*- The importance of each of the following in determining what being Jewish means to you- remembering the Holocaust, having a good sense of humor, working for justice and equality in society, being intellectually curious, eating traditional Jewish foods, caring about Israel, being part of a Jewish community

4. On Israel
    a. *'q.G2-3b'* - How emotionally attached are you to Israel, have you ever been to Israel, or not? have you been to Israel once or more than once?
5. On participation in the context of others
    a. '*h8c*'- Is anyone in your household currently a member of any Jewish organizations other than a synagogue or temple, or not?
    b. *'q.E 9c*' - Please tell me if you agree or disagree: I have a special responsibility to take care of Jews in need around the world
    c. *'q.E11'*- How many of your close friends are Jewish? Would you say all of them, most of them, some of them, or hardly any of them?

Illustration 1 maps religious and cultural identities by zip code across the United States. I divided the religious and cultural scales into 1/3 in order to represent low (0-5), medium (6-10), and high (11-16) measures of identity. This figure supports the assertion that identity needs to be considered in these different religious and cultural frameworks, as identity of different types are found in different places in the country. Our analysis will add further strength to this claim as described below.



Illustration 1: Religious and Cultural Jewish Identity in the United States

DENOMINATIONAL SWITCHING

The Pew study captured both participants' childhood denomination identification and their current denomination identification. For childhood denomination, there are 731 people who affiliated themselves with the Orthodox movement, 1,129 people with the Conservative, 1,070 Reform, and 914 who did not identify with any particular denomination. For current denomination, there are 550 people affiliating with Orthodoxy, 905 with Conservative, 1,332 with Reform, and 1,532 with no denomination. I use a dichotomous dependent variable to identify differences between childhood and current denomination, with 1 indexing a different denomination, and 0 the same denomination. I also identify specific types of shifts: those who now self-identify as Orthodox but were something else as children; and parallel identifiers for those now self-identifying as Conservative or Reform.

CONVERSION IN AND OUT OF JUDAISM

As a final measure of identity, I use conversion into, and out of, Judaism. Here, too, I use two dichotomous variables. 866 respondents identified as converts into Judaism, by which I mean they currently identify as Jewish but report having two non-Jewish parents. These individuals need not have had a formal conversion to be part of this group. 705 respondents are identified as converts out of Judaism. That is, they currently identify as non-Jewish, but report having two Jewish parents.

As seen in Figure 2, there is an expected strong positive correlation between religious and cultural identities (r=0.69). However, they also confirm the lack of complete overlap, supporting my contention that identity is a multidimensional concept.

```
pwcorr ident_rel1 ident_cul4 , sig

             | id~_rel1 ident_~4
-------------+------------------
ident_rel1   |   1.0000
             |
ident_cul4   |   0.6949   1.0000
             |   0.0000
```

Figure 2: Correlation Table for Religious and Cultural Jewish Identity

Explanatory Variables

Three categories of explanatory variables are used.

JEWISH INSTITUTIONS

To analyze the correlation between Jewish cultural and religious identities and Jewish institutions available in communities across the United States, I compiled a comprehensive list of these institutions in the United States. These institutions include temples of all denominations (Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, Reconstructionist), Chabad Houses, Hillels, Jewish Federations, Kosher restaurants, Mikvahs, schools of all types (part-time, day school, early childhood, yeshiva), summer camps (day camp and overnight camp), Jewish Community Centers, Jewish Philanthropies, Jewish Youth Groups, and Moishe Houses. Some of this information is available on public, online databases and were categorized by zip codes, which is ideal since the identity scales are also compiled by zip codes. To collect other information from every Jewish institution, I contacted representatives from the remaining organizations and was able to download

these datasets. Next, I combined these separate datasets and online information into one comprehensive dataset, totaling 9,594 institutions across the United States. Lastly, I coded the institutions by type of Jewish organization --cultural (1), cultural and religious (2), and religious (3) -- so that I could assess the impact and ascertain a more nuanced interaction between types of institutions and types of identity, though models leave open the possibility of cross-type effects. I combined all philanthropies, Jewish Community Centers, and Federations-- all cultural institutions-- into a single variable.

Illustrations 2, 3, and 4 map Jewish Religious, Cultural, and Religious/Cultural (Both) institutions across counties in the United States, respectively. Just like the map of religious and cultural identities, it is clear that there are different quantities of these institutions found in different locations across the United States. Thus, it is important to categorize the institutions in this way to measure their differential impact as seen in subsequent analyses.



Illustrations 2 and 3: Religious Institutions and Cultural Institutions in the United States



Illustration 4: Religious/Cultural Institutions in the United States

CONTROL VARIABLES

Five distinct individual-level characteristics were used as controls, and were all grouped into four categories: education, income, age, current region of residence in the United States, and visiting Israel. Education levels were coded 1 to 4, indexing a high school degree or less, attending some college, completing college, and obtaining a graduate degree. Annual income levels were coded 1 to 4, indexing an annual income of less than $40,000, between $40-75,000, between $75-150,000, and above $150,000. Age groups were also coded 1 to 4, indexing ages 18-39, 40-59, 60-69, and 70-95. Regions of the country where one resides were also coded 1 to 4, indexing by East, Midwest, South,

West. Lastly, visiting Israel was coded 1 to 4, indexing never having visited Israel, visited Israel one time, visited Israel more than once, and lived in Israel.

COUNTY-LEVEL RELIGIOUS ECONOMY DATA

County-level control variables were used to capture contextual effects. This includes a 1-10 scale capturing the urban to rural environment, where higher numbers are more rural environments. Annual household income levels by county and percentage of residents with college degrees. All these are from the US Census Bureau. More directly relevant to the core theme of this paper are two indicators of general religious economies. These variables are the number of Christian churches by county, and the number of non-Christian congregations by county. The source of this information came from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA).

ANALYSIS

All data were merged into a single file by either ZIP code (Pew, Jewish institutions data) or FIPS/County code (US census data; non-Jewish religious insitutions). For each dependent variable, a series of models was then specified. The first model looks at the effects of individual sociodemographic characteristics on the identity scales. A second model adds three county-level socioeconomic and contextual control variables. Model three includes the two indicators of general (non-Jewish) religious economy. The fourth model adds two indicators of Jewish religious institutions: total number of synagogues in the same zip code; and the denomination range of synagogues in the zip code (0-5). The final model adds other Jewish insitutions: number of schools and camps per zip code, and total number of other institutions (Federations, JCCs, etc) per zip code.

Initial models were fit using either OLS (0-16 identity scales) or logit approaches (denominational switching and conversion). In all cases, standard errors were controlled for clustering at either the FIPS level.

Religious Identity

Results of the religious identity models are presented in Table 2. There is a significant negative correlation for all levels of education, such that the more educated one is, the less religious identity one reports. There is a negative effect of age on religious identity but it is only significant for the oldest category, ages 70-95 (-1.405, $p<.05$). Participants this age are statistically less religiously identifiable than people younger than

them. Furthermore, the West region has a lower religious identity than their counterparts on the East Coast (-1.405, $p<.5$). Lastly, although there is also a positive correlation between visiting Israel and religious identity, the strongest net effect is surprisingly when participants have visited Israel more than once, not lived there (5.054, $p<.001$ and 2.733, $p<.05$ respectively). There is also a negative effect of intermarried parents on religious identity (-1.058, $p<.05$).

With respect to religious economy characteristics, the only significant findings is from Jewish institutions, such that the presence of Jewish schools, camps, and congregations have a significantly positive effect on religious identity, (0.102, $p<.05$ and 0.0756, $p<.001$ respectively). Finally, the presence of non-Jewish congregations, as well as the range of Jewish denominations, has no statistically significant effect on reported religious identity.

Table 2: Main Variables' Effect on Religious Identity

VARIABLES	(1) Individual-level characteristics	(2) FIPS-specific characteristics	(3) FIPS-specific measures of religious economy	(4) ZIP-specific measures of Jewish religious economy	(5) Other Jewish-specific institutional data
Education: Some college	-0.969**	-0.907*	-0.899*	-0.860*	-0.704*
	(0.340)	(0.355)	(0.357)	(0.424)	(0.347)
Education: Undergraduate	-1.390**	-1.347**	-1.351**	-1.370**	-1.112**
	(0.434)	(0.440)	(0.443)	(0.507)	(0.397)
Education: Graduate	-2.388***	-2.204***	-2.206***	-2.090***	-1.820***
	(0.428)	(0.443)	(0.441)	(0.520)	(0.397)
Annual Income: $40-75K	-0.386*	-0.312++	-0.313++	-0.290++	-0.250
	(0.182)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.173)	(0.177)
Annual Income: $75-150K	-0.274	-0.214	-0.210	-0.286	-0.158
	(0.277)	(0.254)	(0.253)	(0.252)	(0.237)
Annual Income: >$150K	-0.666	-0.369	-0.380	-0.424	-0.181
	(0.428)	(0.418)	(0.404)	(0.366)	(0.333)
Age Group: 40-59	-0.120	-0.0782	-0.0778	-0.199	-0.0287
	(0.337)	(0.320)	(0.316)	(0.277)	(0.244)
Age Group: 60-69	-0.650	-0.681	-0.674	-0.751++	-0.496
	(0.488)	(0.464)	(0.455)	(0.396)	(0.344)
Age Groups: 70-95	-1.405*	-1.565**	-1.551**	-1.630**	-1.267**
	(0.553)	(0.519)	(0.517)	(0.517)	(0.444)
Region: South	-1.053*	-0.918++	-1.056*	-0.867*	-0.550
	(0.511)	(0.545)	(0.528)	(0.410)	(0.459)
Region: Midwest	-0.615++	-0.686*	-0.773*	-0.524++	-0.124
	(0.336)	(0.307)	(0.317)	(0.299)	(0.267)
Region: West	-1.177**	-1.332***	-1.244***	-0.939***	-0.896**
	(0.366)	(0.227)	(0.269)	(0.258)	(0.272)
Visited Israel: Once	1.325***	1.310***	1.315***	1.163***	1.111***
	(0.258)	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.305)	(0.285)
Visited Israel: > Once	5.054***	4.916***	4.920***	4.518***	4.225***
	(0.327)	(0.328)	(0.328)	(0.319)	(0.318)
Visited Israel: Lived	2.733*	2.519*	2.558*	2.410*	2.407++
	(1.188)	(1.208)	(1.203)	(1.133)	(1.260)
Native American	0.173	0.133	0.104	0.119	0.0959
	(0.298)	(0.287)	(0.288)	(0.277)	(0.281)
Intermarried Parents	-1.058*	-1.041*	-1.059*	-0.925*	-0.744*
	(0.457)	(0.458)	(0.461)	(0.410)	(0.362)
Rural vs. Urban		-0.254*	-0.224	-0.210	-0.0655

VARIABLES	(1) Individual-level characteristics	(2) FIPS-specific characteristics	(3) FIPS-specific measures of religious economy	(4) ZIP-specific measures of Jewish religious economy	(5) Other Jewish-specific institutional data
community					
Table 2 (continued)					
		(0.116)	(0.150)	(0.140)	(0.141)
Annual Household		0.00655	0.00406	0.00540	0.00744
Income					
		(0.00553)	(0.00532)	(0.00440)	(0.00459)
College degrees by county		-0.0723***	-0.0574**	-0.0594***	-0.0614***
		(0.0152)	(0.0186)	(0.0159)	(0.0182)
Presence of Christian Congregations			0.373	0.211	-0.0601
			(0.299)	(0.268)	(0.268)
Presence of Non-Christian Congregations			-0.320	-0.306	0.0274
			(0.252)	(0.222)	(0.224)
Presence of Jewish Congregations				0.133*	0.102*
				(0.0663)	(0.0498)
Presence of Chabad Congregation				0.0879	-0.0142
				(0.200)	(0.188)
Presence of Orthodox Congregation				0.754*	0.204
				(0.323)	(0.312)
Presence of Conservative Congregation				0.371	-0.134
				(0.462)	(0.384)
Presence of Reform Congregation				0.848	0.493
				(0.838)	(0.855)
Presence of Reconstructionist Congregation				-1.436++	-1.803*
				(0.775)	(0.776)
Presence of Jewish schools and camps					0.0756***
					(0.0165)
Presence of JCC, Federation, Philanthropies					-0.0377
					(0.117)
Constant	8.426***	9.650***	8.024***	8.357***	7.973***
	(0.719)	(1.218)	(2.141)	(1.789)	(1.892)

Observations	4,403	4,298	4,298	4,298	4,298
R-squared	0.332	0.347	0.348	0.374	0.394

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ++ p<0.10

Cultural Identity

A different combination of characteristics explains variation in reported cultural identity --results are presented in Table 3. The four individual characteristics that have a significant effect on cultural identity are education, regions, visiting Israel[1], and having intermarried parents. There is a negative effect of education on cultural identity, but it is only significant at the highest education level (-.568, p<.01). With regard to residing in different regions of the United States, compared to those living in the East, there is a significant negative correlation between living in the West, such that Jews living in the West have a lower cultural Jewish identity than Jews living in the East. Lastly, there is a positive correlation between visiting Israel and identity, such that the more times participants have visited or lived in Israel, the stronger their cultural Jewish identity becomes, especially for those who have lived there (1.685, p<.001, 4.084, p<.001, and 4.842, p<.001 respectively). Lastly, having intermarried parents lowers one's cultural identity (-1.188, p.<.001).

Net of these individual-level characteristics, there is also a significant effect of living in a zip code with a range of temples and Jewish schools and camps on cultural identity. It should be noted that there is no significant effect of the presence of non-Jewish congregation on Jewish cultural identity.

[1] There are no marginal effects of education and income on cultural identity.

Table 3: Main Variables' Effect on Cultural Identity

VARIABLES	(1) Individual-level characteristics	(2) FIPS-specific characteristics	(3) FIPS-specific measures of religious economy	(4) ZIP-specific measures of Jewish religious economy	(5) Other Jewish-specific institutional data
Education: Some college	-0.0818	-0.0555	-0.0503	-0.0523	-0.0128
	(0.217)	(0.225)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.223)
Education: Undergraduate	-0.224	-0.226	-0.228	-0.254	-0.191
	(0.185)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.204)	(0.189)
Education: Graduate	-0.568**	-0.491**	-0.492**	-0.444*	-0.377*
	(0.177)	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.197)	(0.181)
Annual Income: $40-75K	-0.220	-0.215	-0.216	-0.175	-0.164
	(0.137)	(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.130)	(0.131)
Annual Income: $75-150K	0.0150	-0.0135	-0.0113	-0.0380	-0.00710
	(0.188)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.178)	(0.182)
Annual Income: >$150K	-0.204	-0.184	-0.193	-0.197	-0.137
	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.196)	(0.191)	(0.193)
Age Group: 40-59	0.0512	0.0950	0.0954	0.100	0.140
	(0.135)	(0.128)	(0.125)	(0.119)	(0.112)
Age Group: 60-69	0.262	0.262	0.265	0.231	0.293++
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.176)	(0.169)
Age Groups: 70-95	0.0593	0.0245	0.0329	0.00725	0.0965
	(0.209)	(0.208)	(0.206)	(0.226)	(0.220)
Region: South	-0.0163	0.0390	-0.0517	-0.000414	0.0698
	(0.243)	(0.252)	(0.253)	(0.214)	(0.233)
Region: Midwest	-0.230	-0.317*	-0.372*	-0.273++	-0.183
	(0.181)	(0.147)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.165)
Region: West	-0.401**	-0.449***	-0.399***	-0.168	-0.157
	(0.150)	(0.120)	(0.116)	(0.133)	(0.141)
Visited Israel: Once	1.685***	1.701***	1.704***	1.625***	1.614***
	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Visited Israel: > Once	4.084***	4.000***	4.002***	3.808***	3.739***
	(0.167)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.113)	(0.118)
Visited Israel: Lived	4.842***	4.784***	4.809***	4.692***	4.696***

	(0.504)	(0.517)	(0.518)	(0.491)	(0.521)
Native American	0.145	0.143	0.126	0.119	0.118
	(0.155)	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.163)	(0.162)
Intermarried Parents	-1.188***	-1.182***	-1.192***	-1.123***	-1.077***
	(0.190)	(0.195)	(0.198)	(0.173)	(0.167)
Rural vs. Urban community		-0.0458	-0.0216	-0.0262	0.00898
		(0.0488)	(0.0717)	(0.0662)	(0.0691)
Annual Household Income		0.00313	0.00163	0.00206	0.00233

Table 3 (continued)

		(0.00246)	(0.00246)	(0.00230)	(0.00294)
College degrees by county		-0.0237***	-0.0142++	-0.0123	-0.0118
		(0.00661)	(0.00819)	(0.00763)	(0.00971)
Presence of Christian Congregations			0.247++	0.185	0.121
			(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.145)
Presence of Non-Christian Congregations			-0.205++	-0.242*	-0.163
			(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.117)
Presence of Jewish Congregations				0.0462++	0.0394++
				(0.0242)	(0.0214)
Presence of Chabad Congregation				0.282++	0.262++
				(0.151)	(0.139)
Presence of Orthodox Congregation				0.567**	0.438*
				(0.177)	(0.181)
Presence of Conservative Congregation				0.620**	0.505*
				(0.231)	(0.202)
Presence of Reform Congregation				0.0731	-0.00359
				(0.444)	(0.441)
Presence of Reconstructionist Congregation				0.389	0.328
				(0.364)	(0.405)
Presence of Jewish schools and camps					0.0182**
					(0.00690)
Presence of JCC, Federation, Philanthropies					-0.0241
					(0.0645)
Constant	8.646***	8.777***	7.650***	7.659***	7.575***

	(0.260)	(0.458)	(1.089)	(1.053)	(1.129)
Observations	4,403	4,298	4,298	4,298	4,298
R-squared	0.449	0.443	0.444	0.457	0.460

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ++ p<0.10

Movement In and Out of Denominations

I set up my models to examine movement in and out of denominations, namely Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. By examining the movement between denominations from childhood to adulthood, one can glean some interesting effects of demographic, spatial, and contextual characteristics.

As seen in Tables 4 and 5, there are significant effects for every single measured individual-level characteristic on moving into and out of these denominations. To begin, there is a negative effect of income on denominational switching. Participants in the highest income bracket, making over $150,000 a year, are the least likely to move both into the Orthodox denomination and the most likely to have left it[2] (-1.815, p<.05 and -1.109, p<.05, respectively).

With regard to education, the only significant effect on moving into a denomination is with Orthodoxy, insofar as more education increases the likelihood of moving into this denomination, with an undergraduate degree being the most significant effect (2.075, p<.001 for undergraduate degree, 1.371, p<.05 for graduate degree). The only significant effect on moving out is with Conservative, such that the more educated participants are, the more likely they are to have moved out of this denomination.

There is also a positive effect of age on moving into the Conservative and Reform denominations, but it is only significant for the oldest category, ages 70-95 (1.073, p<.01

[2] There are no other significant effects of income of moving into or out of Conservative or Reform denominations.

for Conservative and 1.033, p<.001, for Reform). The only significant result for moving out of a stream is for that of Orthodoxy. Compared to the youngest age group, the older one is, the more likely participants are to move out of the Orthodox denomination (1.381, p<.01, 1.971, p<.001, 2.552, p<.001, respectively)[3].

Pertaining to region, participants living on the South and Midwest regions are more likely to move into Orthodoxy, those in the South are significantly less likely to move into Conservative, and those in the Midwest are significantly more likely to move into Reform[4]. For movement out of denominations, the only significant result is that of participants living in the West, who are more likely to move out of Orthodoxy (1.577, p<.05).

As for intermarriage, the only significant effect is for movement into Conservative, which has a positive effect if participants have intermarried parents (1.279, p<.001). Consistently, participants are less likely to move out of Conservative if they have intermarried parents (-0.503, p<.05). Strikingly, participants are more likely to move out of Reform if they have intermarried parents (0.556, p<.05).

Lastly, in terms of visiting Israel, participants are less likely to have moved out of Orthodox streams if they visited Israel more than once, and almost significant if they lived there (-2.066, p<.001 and -1.461, respectively). Participants are also less likely to move out of Conservative if they visited Israel once or more than once (-.602, p<.001 and -.799, p<.001, respectively). Intriguingly, participants are less likely to move from Reform if they visited Israel once, but more likely to move out of Reform if they visited more than once (-.630, p<01 and 0.492, p<.05, respectively)[5].

[3] There are no significant age effects for moving out of Conservative or Reform denominations.
[4] There are no significant effects on moving into denominations for the West region.
[5] No significant results for moving into a denominational stream.

With regard to spatial and religious economy characteristics for both Jewish and non-Jewish institutions, participants are less likely to move into the Orthodox stream if there are schools and camps in their area (-0.0784, $p<.001$), but there are no other significant findings for either Orthodoxy or the other two streams. With regard to moving out of a denomination, participants are significantly less likely to move out of Orthodoxy if there is a presence of non-Christian congregations as well as a presence of Jewish schools and camps in their area (-0.779, $p<.05$ and -.0861, $p<.001$, respectively). The only other significant effect is for moving out of of the Reform denomination. Interestingly, the presence of Jewish congregations increases this movement out of the stream, however having a range of Jewish congregations makes participants less likely to move from the stream (0.237, $p<.01$ and -0.440, $p<.01$, respectively).

Table 4: Movement into Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Denominations

VARIABLES	(1) Move Into Orthodox	(2) Move Into Conservative	(3) Move Into Reform
Education: Some college	0.472	-0.208	0.499
	(0.477)	(0.296)	(0.382)
Education: Undergraduate	2.075***	-0.444	0.282
	(0.515)	(0.282)	(0.305)
Education: Graduate	1.371*	-0.0217	0.408
	(0.631)	(0.357)	(0.337)
Annual Income: $40-75K	-1.749*	-0.359	0.00405
	(0.763)	(0.307)	(0.269)
Annual Income: $75-150K	-0.639	-0.0902	0.211
	(0.603)	(0.332)	(0.279)
Annual Income: >$150K	-1.815*	-0.334	0.200
	(0.739)	(0.374)	(0.254)
Age Group: 40-59	0.581	0.503	0.0661
	(0.470)	(0.421)	(0.243)
Age Group: 60-69	-1.286	0.682++	0.412
	(1.038)	(0.406)	(0.251)
Age Groups: 70-95	-1.310++	1.073**	1.033***
	(0.712)	(0.412)	(0.266)
Region: South	2.704***	-1.022*	-0.138
	(0.649)	(0.472)	(0.270)
Region: Midwest	1.627**	0.112	0.370*
	(0.505)	(0.253)	(0.188)
Region: West	-2.681	-0.325	-0.480++
	(1.852)	(0.338)	(0.286)
Visited Israel: Once	0.132	-0.165	-0.120
	(0.391)	(0.287)	(0.211)
Visited Israel: > Once	-1.169*	0.221	0.417
	(0.457)	(0.241)	(0.283)
Visited Israel: Lived	-1.461++	0.720	1.331
	(0.810)	(0.839)	(1.102)
Intermarried Parents	.0728	1.279***	0.216
	(0.849)	(0.319)	(0.272)
Rural vs. Urban community	-0.199	0.183	-0.117
	(0.338)	(0.138)	(0.141)
Annual Household Income	0.0184*	-0.00455	0.00606
	(0.00934)	(0.00432)	(0.00455)
College degrees by county	-0.0826*	0.0220	-0.0444**
	(0.0362)	(0.0193)	(0.0170)
Presence of Christian Congregations	-0.665	0.549++	0.351
	(0.665)	(0.319)	(0.229)

Presence of Non-Christian Congregations	0.580++ (0.352)	-0.244 (0.222)	-0.270 (0.182)
Presence of Jewish Congregations	0.0141 (0.0129)	0.0394 (0.0359)	0.132++ (0.0728)

Table 4 (continued)

Presence of a range of Jewish Congregations	0.379++ (0.205)	-0.0290 (0.126)	-0.227++ (0.130)
Presence of Jewish schools and camps	-0.0784*** (0.0199)	-0.00467 (0.0102)	-0.00517 (0.0215)
Presence of JCC, Federation, Philanthropies	0.574 (0.465)	-0.0109 (0.0997)	0.0761 (0.0717)
Constant	0.540 (5.666)	-4.308* (2.168)	-2.506 (1.599)
Observations	743	736	1,293

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ++ p<0.10

Table 5: Movement Out of Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Denominations

VARIABLES	(1) Move from Orthodox	(2) Move from Conservative	(3) Move from Reform
Education: Some college	-0.356	0.574	-0.250
	(0.516)	(0.361)	(0.349)
Education: Undergraduate	0.265	0.598++	-0.0179
	(0.469)	(0.357)	(0.344)
Education: Graduate	0.899	0.939**	0.207
	(0.604)	(0.360)	(0.364)
Annual Income: $40-75K	0.508++	-0.335	-0.0805
	(0.302)	(0.308)	(0.317)
Annual Income: $75-150K	-0.322	-0.288	0.135
	(0.404)	(0.366)	(0.295)
Annual Income: >$150K	-1.109*	-0.0478	0.136
	(0.478)	(0.432)	(0.256)
Age Group: 40-59	1.381**	-0.143	0.0421
	(0.454)	(0.242)	(0.242)
Age Group: 60-69	1.971***	-0.0348	0.125
	(0.400)	(0.304)	(0.258)
Age Groups: 70-95	2.552***	-0.323	-0.561
	(0.397)	(0.323)	(0.425)
Region: South	1.683++	0.302	0.0382
	(0.955)	(0.400)	(0.338)
Region: Midwest	0.334	0.153	0.436++
	(0.648)	(0.188)	(0.250)
Region: West	1.577*	0.102	0.459
	(0.614)	(0.242)	(0.323)
Visited Israel: Once	-0.518	-0.602***	-0.630**
	(0.418)	(0.156)	(0.229)
Visited Israel: > Once	-2.066***	-0.799***	0.492*
	(0.334)	(0.217)	(0.216)
Visited Israel: Lived	-1.461++	-1.128	1.307
	(0.810)	(0.775)	(1.213)
Intermarried Parents	-0.699	-0.503*	0.556*
	(0.799)	(0.256)	(0.245)
Rural vs. Urban community	0.102	-0.224++	0.0776
	(0.292)	(0.132)	(0.137)
Annual Household Income	-0.0181*	-0.00441	-0.000750
	(0.00820)	(0.00373)	(0.00429)
College degrees by county	0.103**	0.00749	-0.0111
	(0.0347)	(0.0152)	(0.0168)
Presence of Christian Congregations	0.788	-0.0523	0.129
	(0.594)	(0.282)	(0.321)
Presence of Non-Christian	-0.779*	0.124	-0.223

Congregations	(0.309)	(0.199)	(0.260)
Presence of Jewish Congregations	-0.0226	-0.0118	0.237**
	(0.0310)	(0.0355)	(0.0776)

Table 5 (continued)

Presence of a range of Jewish Congregations	0.0359	0.0901	-0.440**
	(0.190)	(0.0871)	(0.158)
Presence of Jewish schools and camps	-0.0861***	-0.00393	0.0268
	(0.0209)	(0.0122)	(0.0214)
Presence of JCC, Federation, Philanthropies	0.0174	0.00302	-0.0491
	(0.128)	(0.0860)	(0.0887)
Constant	-2.749	1.241	-0.588
	(4.185)	(1.825)	(1.971)
Observations	858	1,089	1,087

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ++ p<0.10

Denominations and Intermarriage

In order to examine the effects of intermarriage on religious and cultural identity, I broke down not only childhood religious self-identification but also current religious self-identification by the three main streams of Judaism: Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox[6].

I initially needed to assess, of those who identify with these streams in their childhood, which people had two Jewish parents, and which people had one non-Jewish parent. In this sample of participants who were asked this question (N=3.459), 1,266 were Reform in their childhood, 1,239 were Conservative, and 954 were Orthodox. Within the Reform denomination, 1,037 (82%) had two Jewish parents, and 229 (18%) had intermarried parents. Within Conservative, 1,135 (92%) had two Jewish parents, and 104 (8%) had intermarried parents. Finally, within the Orthodox denomination, 880 (92%) had two Jewish parents, and 74 (8%) had intermarried parents.

I also broke down the Orthodox denomination into three main identifiers within this movement: Modern Orthodox, Hasidic, and Yeshivish. Of these groups, 96% (N=433) of Modern Orthodox people have two Jewish parents and 4% (N=17) have one Jewish parent and 98% (N=205) of Hasidic Orthodox people have two Jewish parents and 2% (N=5) have one. Interestingly, only 78% (N=147) of Yeshivish Orthodox people have two Jewish parents, whereas 22% (N=40) have only one Jewish parent.

---

[6] I did not look at participant's intermarriage rates largely due to methodological reasons. The Pew Study did not ask for a date of marriage, marriage history, or religion/denomination of first spouse. In addition, since certain attitudes surrounding intermarriage may delay marriage, there is a selectivity issues in terms of who in the sample has a partner. Therefore, they did not ask through enough questions to establish a causal relationship between chances of getting married to a Jewish person. It is interesting to note, however, that having intermarried parents does not change one's probability of getting married. In fact, we cannot tell what religion one's spouse will be, but having intermarried parents does not affect the changes that one will get married at all.

Next, I ran this demographic information for current religious identification and intermarried parents. In this sample (N=4,394), 1,235 currently do not identify with any denomination, 1,482 identify with the Reform movement, 854 are Conservative, and 823 are Orthodox. For non-denominational identification, 681 (55%) have two Jewish parents, yet 554 (45%) have intermarried parents. Within the Reform denomination, 1,271 (86%) have two Jewish parents, whereas 211 (14%) have intermarried parents. Within Conservative, 737 (86%) have two Jewish parents, yet 117 (14%) have intermarried parents. Lastly, within Orthodox, 765 (93%) have two Jewish parents, and 58 (7%) have intermarried parents.

Once I was able to see these trends across denominations, I replicated these models to look for age effects. More specifically I wanted to see the effect of childhood denomination on the likelihood that one's parents were intermarried. As seen in Figure 3, among those aged 18-39, more than 70% of those who reported no childhood denomination grew up in a mixed marriage. Equivalent percentages across denomination are 43% among those who reported growing up Reform, 16% among those who grew up Conservative, and 5% among those who grew up Orthodox. Indeed, trends vary significantly not only across denominations but also across age groups. There are signs of decline in the proportion of growing up in a non-denominational intermarried family across age groups, decelerating decrease for Reform, linear increase among Conservative, and stability among the Orthodox, with the exception of the large increase in likelihood for the 60-69 age group. This blip can be attributed to the surprising demographic characteristic of the Yeshivish community[7]. Likewise, there was no significant presence

[7] One hypothesis for this phenomenon could be the Baal Teshuvah movement that burgeoned in the 1970s, when this cohort was in their 20s. People who returned to Judaism had to engage in intensive study to familiarize themselves with traditions, and could potentially consider themselves "Yeshivish", for they studied in Yeshivas during this time. However, because they did not grow up religious, they may be more likely to have intermarried parents.

of religious identity for this age group (see Table 2), so this may be correlated with their denominational affiliation.



Figure 3: Childhood Denomination for Children of Intermarriage

I also examined these age effects for one's current denominational identification to see how they self-identify given that they grew up in an intermarried family. As seen in Figure 4, there are somewhat similar results from childhood denomination. For current denomination, among those aged 18-39, more than 70% of those who reported no current denomination grew up in a mixed marriage. For this same age group across denominations are 38% among those who report being Reform, 21% among those who are Conservative, and 3% among those who are Orthodox. In addition, there are signs of decline in the proportion of being in a non-denominational intermarried family across age groups, decelerating decrease for Reform, a linear and then decrease trend among Conservative, and an even larger increase than childhood denomination for the 60-69 age

group, of about 35% likelihood of having intermarried parents, compared to 25% chance for childhood denomination.



Figure 4: Current Denomination for Children of Intermarriage

In the second stage of this analysis, I ran a secondary set of models (see Appendix A) to measure interaction effects of intermarriage on the same core standardized characteristics that have been used in other models in this analysis. For religious identity for the 18-39 age group, having intermarried parents reduces one's score on religious scale, or chances of a stronger religious identity, by 4.67 points (see Table 8). Indeed, the largest effect can be seen for this age group, although the there are still significant negative effects of intermarriage on religious identity for all other age groups. To expand, for participants aged 40-59, there is a 3.9 point reduction in religious identity, for the 60-69 age group there is a 2.3 point reduction, and for the 70-95 age group there is a 4.1

point reduction in religious identity. Overall, the negatively significant effect is smaller for the older age groups, but only marginally smaller.

In terms of cultural identity, there are some negative effects, but not for every age group (see Table 9). For cultural identity for the 18-39 age group, having intermarried parents reduces one's score on the scale by 3.27 points. For participants aged 40-59, they see a reduction of 2.76 points, for the 60-69 age group there is a 1.87 point reduction in cultural identity, and the 70-95 age group does not have a significant effect, but still sees a 1.84 point reduction. Overall, just like religious identity, the 18-39 age group is the most negatively affected by having intermarried parents, which is the most alarming since this age group is the future generation of Jewish Americans. Moreover, although intermarriage has a negative affect for both aspects of identity, there is a stronger effect on religious identity than on cultural identity.

With regard to education, all levels of education have a significantly negative result on religious identity. For children of intermarriages, the more education one receives, the *less* religious identity one will have. The largest effect can be seen for those with a graduate degree, who have a 6.4 point reduction in religious identity, compared to those with a high school degree or less, who have a 5.2 point reduction[8].

After examining region of the country where one lives, the only significant region affecting religious identity is the West, which has a 5.8 point reduction in religious identity. For cultural identity the West is also the only significant region, with a 3.9 point reduction in cultural identity. Once again, religious identity is affected more severely than education on children of intermarriages.

[8] No significant effects of education on cultural identity.

In the second model, I added visits to Israel to ascertain the effects of visiting Israel on children of intermarriages. For religious identity, there is a 1.28 point reduction in religious identity for participants who been to Israel once. However, the negative effects of intermarriage are diminished for those who have visited Israel more than once. To expand, there is a 2.11 increase in religious identity for those children of intermarriages who have visited Israel more than once. For cultural identity, the effects of visiting Israel are even stronger. For participants who have visited Israel once, their cultural identity increases by .063 points. For participants who have been to Israel more than once, this increases jumps to 2.43, and for those who have lived there it increases to 3.15 points. Thus, visits to Israel dramatically increases one's cultural identity and negates the negative effects of intermarriage on one's identity, whilst also has a positive effect in some regard on religious identity.

Lastly, in the third and final model I included religious economy characteristics, including the number of Christian churches, number of non-Christian congregations, and Jewish temples and schools. For religious identity, the presence of Christian churches reduces one's religious identity by 1.47 points, and reduces one's cultural identity by 1.03 points. The presence of non-Christian congregations decreases the religious identity of a child of intermarriage by 2.5 points, and cultural identity by 1.55 points. With regard to the presence of Jewish temples in one's community, there is a 1.9 point reduction in religious identity, and a 1.32 point reduction for cultural identity. Interestingly, whereas religious economy characteristics have been successfully proven in other models, the negative effects of intermarriage outweigh the potential benefits of living in a community with religious institution. Most importantly, parental intermarriage is highly correlated with key variables in this model. Therefore, this variables needs to be incorporated into

further analyses to see how Jewish institutions affect the religious and cultural identities of intermarried children.

Conversion in and out of Judaism

There are some interesting significant effects of conversion into and out of Judaism. To recall, conversion in refers to an individual who has two non-Jewish parents but who self-identifies as Jewish. In contrast, conversion out refers to an individual who had two Jewish parents but who now identifies as non-Jewish.

First I analyzed the effects of individuals who have converted in. As seen in Table 6, there is a negative effect of age, but it is only significant for the oldest categories, ages 60-69 and 70-95 (-.532, $p<.05$ and -1.277, $p<0.001$, respectively). In terms of education, the more educated one is, the less likely they are to have converted in. Income only has a mild negative effect, such that with more money, individuals are slightly less likely to have converted in. As for region where one resides, an individual is more likely to have converted into Judaism in the Midwest and South than in the East coast. Intriguingly, participants are much less likely to convert into Judaism if one has visited Israel once, more than once, and even lived there, compared to if that individual has not visited Israel at all (-1.693, $p<.001$, -3.087, $p<.001$, -2.525, $p<.001$, respectively). Lastly, for religious economy characteristics, the more Christian congregations and Jewish congregations there are in one's zip code, the more likely one is to convert in. In contrast, the more Non-Christian congregations there are, the less likely one is to convert in. Interestingly, the more Jewish schools there are in one's community, the less likely one is to convert in.

Table 6: Main Variables' Effect on Converting into Judaism

VARIABLES	(1) Individual-level characteristics	(2) FIPS-specific characteristics	(3) FIPS-specific measures of religious economy	(4) ZIP-specific measures of Jewish religious economy	(5) Other Jewish-specific institutional data
Education: Some college	0.236	0.0403	0.0550	0.0904	0.0694
	(0.256)	(0.268)	(0.257)	(0.236)	(0.227)
Education: Undergraduate	-0.677*	-0.653*	-0.693*	-0.705**	-0.718**
	(0.275)	(0.293)	(0.291)	(0.269)	(0.254)
Education: Graduate	-0.788*	-0.845*	-0.847**	-0.942**	-0.979**
	(0.322)	(0.333)	(0.328)	(0.311)	(0.300)
Annual Income: $40-75K	0.215	0.0648	0.0908	0.113	0.0821
	(0.169)	(0.197)	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.195)
Annual Income: $75-150K	-0.532*	-0.421	-0.428	-0.416++	-0.448++
	(0.252)	(0.275)	(0.263)	(0.233)	(0.229)
Annual Income: >$150K	-0.543*	-0.406	-0.383	-0.228	-0.305
	(0.259)	(0.297)	(0.296)	(0.263)	(0.250)
Age Group: 40-59	0.208	0.0609	0.112	0.183	0.0922
	(0.242)	(0.246)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.234)
Age Group: 60-69	-0.532*	-0.432	-0.346	-0.291	-0.351
	(0.270)	(0.271)	(0.265)	(0.272)	(0.268)
Age Groups: 70-95	-1.277***	-1.188***	-1.140***	-0.948***	-1.040***
	(0.258)	(0.264)	(0.263)	(0.250)	(0.253)
Region: South	0.516	0.604++	0.454++	0.440*	0.340++
	(0.339)	(0.342)	(0.272)	(0.206)	(0.195)
Region: Midwest	0.800**	0.847**	0.655*	0.682**	0.523*
	(0.295)	(0.303)	(0.273)	(0.210)	(0.223)
Region: West	0.635*	0.714**	1.167***	0.767***	0.634***
	(0.266)	(0.254)	(0.217)	(0.185)	(0.171)
Visited Israel: Once	-1.693***	-1.560***	-1.516***	-1.375***	-1.306***
	(0.170)	(0.172)	(0.168)	(0.157)	(0.157)
Visited Israel: > Once	-3.087***	-2.987***	-2.972***	-2.757***	-2.604***
	(0.233)	(0.246)	(0.243)	(0.267)	(0.265)
Visited Israel: Lived	-2.525***	-2.414***	-2.321***	-2.181**	-2.085**
	(0.668)	(0.639)	(0.666)	(0.712)	(0.719)
Native American	-0.452*	-0.643***	-0.810***	-0.849***	-0.828***
	(0.201)	(0.192)	(0.187)	(0.176)	(0.178)
Rural vs. Urban community		0.417***	0.266***	0.281***	0.251***
		(0.0787)	(0.0804)	(0.0750)	(0.0716)

Table 6 (continued)

Annual Household Income		0.00108	-0.00710	-0.00385	-0.00648++
		(0.00533)	(0.00526)	(0.00367)	(0.00341)
College degrees by county		-0.0105	0.0241	0.0139	0.0211++
		(0.0108)	(0.0155)	(0.0119)	(0.0127)
Presence of Christian Congregations			0.385++	0.359++	0.360*
			(0.231)	(0.183)	(0.178)
Presence of Non-Christian Congregations			-0.640***	-0.487**	-0.482***
			(0.188)	(0.148)	(0.146)
Presence of Jewish Congregations				0.0246	0.0359*
				(0.0168)	(0.0181)
Presence of Chabad Congregation				-0.521**	-0.399*
				(0.174)	(0.184)
Presence of Orthodox Congregation				-1.653***	-1.348***
				(0.236)	(0.230)
Presence of Conservative Congregation				-2.174***	-1.728***
				(0.340)	(0.362)
Presence of Reform Congregation				-0.802	-0.343
				(0.528)	(0.497)
Presence of Reconstructionist Congregation				0.0893	0.598
				(1.130)	(1.174)
Presence of Jewish schools and camps					-0.0571*
					(0.0258)
Presence of JCC, Federation, Philanthropies					-0.235
					(0.156)
Constant	0.232	-0.0946	0.258	0.0216	0.647
	(0.490)	(1.407)	(1.581)	(1.390)	(1.251)
Observations	3,935	3,824	3,824	3,824	3,824

As for converting out, the age pattern is much less pronounced. As seen in Table 7, elderly people are still less likely to have converted out, but with a much smaller effect

than individuals who converted in (-.471, p<0.001, compared to -1.277, p<0.01). Similar to converting in, the most educated group is much more likely to have converted out. There are no income effects for individuals who converted out. For region where one lives, an individual is much more likely to convert out if they live in the West coast, but there are no other regional effects. This is consistent with the research on religious movement, as the West coast is the region with the most religious movement. There is a significant negative effect for visiting Israel, with the greatest effect seen if one has lived in Israel (-.0775, p<.001, -1.698, p<.001, -1.828, p<.001, respectively). As such, participants are much less likely to convert out of Judaism if they have visited Israel even once, and especially less likely if they have lived there.

As for religious economy characteristics, there are almost the same marginal effects as seen with converting in: the more Christian congregations there are, the more likely one will convert out, but the more Non-Christian congregations there are, the less likely one will convert out (.327, p <.05 and -.408, p <.05 for converting out; .360, p <.05 and -.482, p<.01 for converting in). In addition, just like converting in, the more Jewish schools and camps there are in one's community, the less likely one is to convert in.

Table 7: Main Variables' Effect on Converting out of Judaism

VARIABLES	(1) Individual-level characteristics	(2) FIPS-specific characteristics	(3) FIPS-specific measures of religious economy	(4) ZIP-specific measures of Jewish religious economy	(5) Other Jewish-specific institutional data
Education: Some college	0.533*	0.505++	0.521++	0.504++	0.474++
	(0.264)	(0.274)	(0.271)	(0.283)	(0.273)
Education: Undergraduate	0.610**	0.616**	0.594*	0.601*	0.545*
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.237)	(0.237)	(0.229)
Education: Graduate	0.899***	0.850**	0.819**	0.784**	0.725**
	(0.262)	(0.261)	(0.261)	(0.258)	(0.247)
Annual Income: $40-75K	0.0414	0.0455	0.0408	0.0226	0.00587
	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.147)	(0.151)
Annual Income: $75-150K	-0.131	-0.120	-0.113	-0.0887	-0.109
	(0.155)	(0.164)	(0.165)	(0.170)	(0.170)
Annual Income: >$150K	-0.0918	-0.0720	-0.0554	-0.0427	-0.0890
	(0.217)	(0.225)	(0.221)	(0.207)	(0.204)
Age Group: 40-59	-0.170	-0.168	-0.174	-0.183	-0.240
	(0.166)	(0.169)	(0.174)	(0.166)	(0.167)
Age Group: 60-69	-0.329	-0.312	-0.294	-0.277	-0.340++
	(0.200)	(0.203)	(0.205)	(0.199)	(0.197)
Age Groups: 70-95	-0.471**	-0.442**	-0.421**	-0.382**	-0.453**
	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.151)	(0.144)	(0.140)
Region: South	0.228	0.177	0.102	0.0522	-0.0253
	(0.205)	(0.199)	(0.220)	(0.201)	(0.200)
Region: Midwest	0.291	0.330++	0.198	0.146	0.0448
	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.160)	(0.139)	(0.139)
Region: West	0.834***	0.851***	1.153***	0.929***	0.891***
	(0.179)	(0.151)	(0.139)	(0.166)	(0.170)
Visited Israel: Once	-0.775***	-0.774***	-0.751***	-0.714***	-0.703***
	(0.129)	(0.133)	(0.130)	(0.125)	(0.126)
Visited Israel: > Once	-1.698***	-1.652***	-1.650***	-1.551***	-1.498***
	(0.165)	(0.164)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.166)
Visited Israel: Lived	-1.828***	-1.761***	-1.774***	-1.738***	-1.720***
	(0.476)	(0.480)	(0.473)	(0.473)	(0.482)
Native American	-0.629***	-0.627***	-0.711***	-0.739***	-0.727***
	(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.146)	(0.168)	(0.167)
Rural vs. Urban community		0.193**	0.0858	0.0950	0.0696
		(0.0660)	(0.0826)	(0.0796)	(0.0793)
Annual Household Income		-0.00455++	-0.00994***	-0.0103***	-0.0111***

Table 7 (continued)

		(0.00232)	(0.00278)	(0.00267)	(0.00268)
College degrees by county		0.0193**	0.0393***	0.0373***	0.0393***
		(0.00689)	(0.00982)	(0.00891)	(0.00939)
Presence of Christian Congregations			0.250	0.290++	0.327*
			(0.179)	(0.164)	(0.157)
Presence of Non-Christian Congregations			-0.411**	-0.364**	-0.408**
			(0.150)	(0.138)	(0.130)
Presence of Jewish Congregations				-0.0377	-0.0252
				(0.0294)	(0.0252)
Presence of Chabad Congregation				-0.338*	-0.298++
				(0.158)	(0.156)
Presence of Orthodox Congregation				-0.530**	-0.422*
				(0.198)	(0.197)
Presence of Conservative Congregation				-0.608*	-0.474
				(0.306)	(0.290)
Presence of Reform Congregation				-0.0944	0.0244
				(0.581)	(0.574)
Presence of Reconstructionist Congregation				-0.493	-0.301
				(0.378)	(0.324)
Presence of Jewish schools and camps					-0.0217***
					(0.00479)
Presence of JCC, Federation, Philanthropies					-0.0304
					(0.0438)
Constant	-0.917***	-0.726	-0.353	-0.247	-0.0503
	(0.259)	(0.554)	(1.239)	(1.114)	(1.089)
Observations	3,506	3,417	3,417	3,417	3,417

DISCUSSION

A number of important findings emerge across this series of analyses. To begin, there are several notable age patterns effects. There is a negative effect of age on religious identity, but it is only significant for the oldest category, ages 70-95. Participants who are this age are statistically less religiously identifiable than people younger than them. For cultural identity, there is a positive effect of age, but it is only significant for the 60-69 age group. Individuals in this age group are statistically more identifiable with cultural Judaism than all other age groups. It is intriguing that the identity of the 60-69 cohort, those living in the 1970s, was only ignited in a cultural way. This finding is unique because participants in their 60s today were late teens and twenties during the 1970s, which is not only an impressionable age for identity formation, but also a decade where there was an immense appreciation and support for Israel and Zionism in general— a marker of cultural Jewish identity— across the United States. With regard to the third measure of identity, denominational switching, we also see a positive effect of age on moving into the Conservative and Reform denominations, but it is only significant for the oldest category, ages 70-95. The only significant results for moving out of a stream is for that of Orthodoxy, as the oldest age group is the most likely to have moved out of Orthodox. Finally, for the fourth identity measure, conversion, the oldest age group is the least likely group to convert into Judaism. This could be the case because most conversion happens for people under age 40, usually in conjunction with marriage. There is also a negative effect of age on converting out, but it is only significant for the 70-95 age group. Thus, these participants are also the least likely group to have converted out of Judaism, but with a much smaller comparative effect when looking at converting in (-.471, $p<0.01$). Thus, it must be noted that the youngest age group, 18-39, are both the

most likely to have converted into Judaism and also the most likely to have converted out of Judaism. Without data on age of transition for the older members of the sample we cannot know whether this phenomenon is specific to the Millenial age group. But it is consistent with the hypothesis that identity is most impressionable and subject to change in adolescence and young adulthood.

There are also important effects of visiting Israel on these four measures of identity. There is a positive correlation between visiting Israel and religious identity, yet the strongest net effect is when participants have visited Israel more than once, not lived there. For cultural identity, the more times participants have visited or lived in Israel, the stronger their cultural Jewish identity becomes. Since I coded emotional attachment to Israel and visits to Israel in the cultural scale, it is not surprising that these effect are much stronger, and positive, on this measure of identity than on the religious scale. With regard to the third measure, denominational switching, participants are less likely to move out of Orthodox streams if they visited Israel more than once, and almost significant if they lived there and also less likely to move out of Conservative if they visited Israel once or more than once. This is intuitive as visiting Israel can strengthen one's connection to religion, tradition, and spirituality. Intriguingly, participants are less likely to move from Reform if they visited Israel once, but more likely to move out of Reform if they visited more than once. Given this exposure to religion and tradition, people who visit Israel with a Reform affiliation may choose to realign with denomination that stress religious practice more than Reform does.

The most interesting effects are found on the fourth measure, conversion. Participants are much less likely to have converted into Judaism if they have visited Israel once, more than once, and even lived there, compared to if that individual has not visited Israel at all. Again, the absence of dates makes interpretation difficult. It may be, for

example, that the effect is reversed: converts are much less likely to have visited Israel. Either way, this negative relationship suggests that people may not feel the need to formally convert into Judaism if they are already connected to an important source of Jewish identity. This interpretation gets some information support from models looking at converting out of Judaism. Here we see a significant negative effect for visiting Israel, with the greatest effect seen if one has lived in Israel. As such, participants are much less likely to convert out of Judaism if they have visited Israel even once, and especially less likely if they have lived there. This may be the case because exposure to Israel revives one's Jewish connection to the land and its people, and as such individuals may be less inclined to disassociate from that connection.

Region of the country where one resides also has notable effects on these four measures. For the first measure, religious identity, there is a significant negative effect for all regions, with the exception of the Midwest. Furthermore, the West region has a lower religious identity than their counterparts on the East coast. With regard to cultural identity, there is a negative effect for all regions, but it is only significant for the West. As for denominational switching, participants living on the South and Midwest regions are more likely to move into Orthodoxy, those in the South are significantly less likely to move into Conservative, and those in the Midwest are significantly more likely to move into Reform. For movement out of denominations, the only those living in the West are more likely to move out of Orthodoxy.

Lastly, for the fourth measure of identity, conversion, individuals are much more likely to have converted into Judaism in every region aside from the East coast. For converting out of Judaism, individuals are much more likely to convert out if they live in the West coast, but there are no other regional effects. All of these findings are consistent with research suggesting that there is the most religious movement and least religious

observance in the Western region of the country. This is consistent with longstanding research on religious economies in the U.S., as the West coast is the region with the most religious movement in general.

The final individual-level characteristic requiring discussion is the effect of growing up with intermarried parents. There is a similarly-sized negative effect of intermarried parents on both religious and cultural identities (-1.058, $p<.05$ and -1.188, $p.<.001$ respectively). For denominational switching, the only significant effect is for movement into and out of Conservative, whereby participants are more likely to move into and less likely to move out of Conservative if they have intermarried parents. Strikingly, participants are more likely to move out of Reform if they have intermarried parents (0.556, $p<.05$). This is surprising since the Reform movement stresses inclusivity, which would suggest that children of intermarriage would feel comfortable in this movement. Further research should investigate if where these participants moved to, although my hypothesis is that they moved out of any denominational affiliation altogether.

Individual-level characteristics aside, I transition into a discussion on the impact of institutions on Jewish identity. To begin, the presence of Jewish schools, camps, and congregations have a significantly positive effect on religious identity. Furthermore, the presence of a range in types of Jewish congregations does not have an effect on religious identity, however. Perhaps this is the finding because one attends a temple that is in alignment with one's denominational affiliation, and as such having a range of denominationally affiliated temples does not impact an individuals' participation in their own congregation. As for cultural identity, there is also a significant effect of living in a zip code with a range of temples and Jewish schools and camps on cultural identity. For denominational switching, participants are less likely to move into and out of the

Orthodox stream if there are schools and camps in their area. With regard to moving out of a denomination, the presence of Jewish congregations increases this movement out of Reform, however having a range of Jewish congregations makes participants less likely to move from the stream. Lastly, for effects on conversion, the more Jewish congregations there are in one's zip code, the more likely one is to convert in. However, there is a negative effect of ranges of Jewish congregations on converting in, but it is only significant for the presence of Chabad, Orthodox, and Conservative temples. Perhaps these denominations are less inclusive than the progressive denominations, and as such individuals may be less likely to convert when these are the institutions in their zip code. There are different effect on individuals who converted out. Having a range of congregations in one's zip code does not affect this phenomenon, nor does the total number of temples. Interestingly, for both converting in and out, the presence of Jewish schools and camps has a significant negative effect (-0.0571, $p<.05$ and -0.0217, $p<.001$, respectively). Interestingly, the presence of JCCs, Philanthropies, and Federations do not have a significant impact on religious, cultural, or conversion in, and conversion out identities. Overall, it can be seen that the presence of Jewish congregations, and in some cases Jewish schools and camps, increases several measures of Jewish identity, and as such, it can be concluded that at least some institutions have a significant impact on identity.

Lastly, there are notable effects of the presence of non-Jewish institutions in one's zip code on Jewish identity. For both religious and cultural identities, the presence of neither Christian nor Non-Christian congregations has no statistically significant effect on reported religious identity. Furthermore, participants are significantly less likely to move out of Orthodoxy if there is a presence of non-Christian congregations. Lastly, there are almost the same marginal effects seen in converting in and out of Judaism: the more

Christian congregations there are in the county where one lives, the more likely one is to both convert into and out. In contrast, the more Non-Christian congregations there are, the less likely one is to both convert in and out (.327, $p < .05$ and -.408, $p < .05$ for convert out; .360, $p < .05$ and -.482, $p < .01$ for convert in). Further research needs to be done to place these Jewish communities in the context of religious participation of the religions with greater market position. However, with the data available in this study, the conclusion is that the presence of other religious does not mobilize Jews to have stronger affiliations or identities as the religious economy hypotheses suggested.

CONCLUSION

This paper has explored the key determinants of Jewish identity in the United States It is now clear that the youngest age group, Millennials aged 18-39, are the most affected in both positive and negative ways, with some unique findings for the older age groups. These findings support the hypothesis that identity formation is the most formative in adolescence and young adulthood. In addition, going to Israel has a huge positive impact on conversion, religious and cultural identities, and intermarriage. With regard to intermarriage, there is a negative impact on every measure of identity, although this impact is diminished by visiting Israel. With regard to region where one lives, the most movement occurs in the West, where there is also the lowest levels of religious and cultural Jewish identity. As for religious economy characteristics, it can be seen that the presence of Jewish congregations, and in some cases Jewish schools and camps, increases several measures of Jewish identity, and as such, it can be concluded that at least some institutions have a significant impact on identity.

The main limitation of this study is the issue of reverse causality. Since the Pew dataset did not ask participants when they moved to their current residences, we cannot fully distinguish whether levels of Jewish identity are a function of their effort to build up the institutions in their communities, or whether the presence of institutions is what drew strongly identified Jews to move into these communities. I was able to collect dates of establishment for some institutions in the dataset (almost all synagogues, for example), and they have no effect on levels of identity. But without data on people's own

geographic mobility we could not compare them with the individuals in the sample, which prevented the examination of this phenomenon.

Further research needs to be done with regard to the Millennial age group. The array of significant findings for this age group elucidates the need to delve into these phenomena more thoroughly to explore the reasons for this movement and identity patterns. Furthermore, because this age group includes the future members of American Jewry, it is of the utmost importance to find answers that can help alter the course of Jewry in the United States.

In addition, future research should to place these Jewish communities in the context of religious participation of the religions with greater market position, such as Protestantism. Since the data only provided the number of congregations, and not affiliation information, it is hard to determine the influence of non-Jewish affiliation and identification on Jews' identification and mobilization in these communities. Similarly, it would be worthwhile to distinguish aspects of other religions' identities in comparison to Jewish identity. Indeed, although this study focused on the multi-dimensions of Jewish identity, surely other religions have these nuanced aspects of identity. Perhaps there would be different effects for different types of identities, or even different sets of determinants that affect other religions' identities.

Moreover, this research was done solely in the United States context, where religious economies are larger and more diverse than in other countries. This is true not only for Judaism, but for other religions as well. Given this, Americans have more choices afforded to them to express their Jewish identity, whereas abroad these identities are more constrained by the lack of access to types of institutions that are available in the United States. Thus, future research should expand these questions to other Jewish communities, with special consideration taken to those religious economy characteristics

and restraints. Along these lines, this study measured spatial models as the same zip code. Given the importance of one's environment, additional studies should examine spatial effects more directly by estimating effects with spatial regression techniques.

Either way, it is clear that the availability of Jewish institutions is associated with different measures of Jewish identity, over and above all other individuals and contextual effects. This is an important finding. It can be found across the different types of Jewish identity. Future research should focus on expanding our ability to identify causal patterns in more robust ways, while continuing to measure identity in all its complexities

Appendix

Table 8: Interaction Effects of Intermarriage on Religious Identity

VARIABLES	(1) Individual-level characteristics	(2) Individual-level Jewish measures including visiting Israel	(3) ZIP-specific measures of Jewish religious economy
Education: Some college	-0.794*	-0.915**	-0.689*
	(0.342)	(0.284)	(0.300)
Education: Undergraduate	-0.916**	-1.478***	-1.210***
	(0.332)	(0.254)	(0.262)
Education: Graduate	-1.954***	-2.366***	-1.904***
	(0.391)	(0.315)	(0.309)
Annual Income: $40-75K	-0.100	-0.258	-0.236
	(0.241)	(0.212)	(0.223)
Annual Income: $75-150K	0.204	-0.0797	-0.158
	(0.357)	(0.259)	(0.252)
Annual Income: >$150K	-0.0474	-0.675++	-0.296
	(0.492)	(0.347)	(0.317)
Age Group: 40-59	-1.542**	-0.818*	-0.496
	(0.543)	(0.398)	(0.320)
Age Group: 60-69	-2.681***	-1.625***	-1.260***
	(0.499)	(0.368)	(0.352)
Age Groups: 70-95	-2.609***	-2.092***	-1.785***
	(0.545)	(0.408)	(0.349)
Region: South	-0.989++	-0.947*	-0.834*
	(0.545)	(0.396)	(0.398)
Region: Midwest	-0.639++	-0.561*	-0.358
	(0.374)	(0.273)	(0.235)
Region: West	-1.369**	-1.066**	-0.738*
	(0.436)	(0.325)	(0.308)
Visited Israel: Once		1.280***	1.104***
		(0.207)	(0.201)
Visited Israel: > Once		4.778***	4.147***
		(0.356)	(0.313)
Visited Israel: Lived		2.478*	2.405++
		(1.052)	(1.238)
Intermarried Parents	-4.489***	-2.591***	-1.905***
	(0.501)	(0.429)	(0.397)
Presence of Christian Congregations			0.459++
			(0.238)
Presence of Non-Christian			-0.412*

Congregations			
			(0.185)
Presence of Jewish Congregations			0.105**
			(0.0370)
Presence of Chabad Congregation			0.0437
			(0.247)
Presence of Orthodox Congregation			0.324
			(0.297)
Presence of Conservative Congregation			-0.0410
			(0.362)
Presence of Reform Congregation			0.419
			(0.829)
Presence of Reconstructionist Congregation			-1.943*
			(0.857)
Presence of Jewish schools and camps			0.0692***
			(0.0143)
Presence of JCC, Federation, Philanthropies			-0.133
			(0.0933)
Constant	11.10***	9.110***	5.831***
	(0.617)	(0.478)	(1.335)
Observations	4,880	4,880	4,281
R-squared	0.137	0.333	0.396

Table 9: Interaction Effects of Intermarriage on Cultural Identity

VARIABLES	(1) Individual-level characteristics	(2) Individual-level Jewish measures including visiting Israel	(3) ZIP-specific measures of Jewish religious economy
Education: Some college	0.118	-0.00987	-0.0119
	(0.216)	(0.191)	(0.206)
Education: Undergraduate	0.274	-0.236	-0.213
	(0.190)	(0.160)	(0.178)
Education: Graduate	-0.129	-0.524**	-0.397*
	(0.232)	(0.192)	(0.202)
Annual Income: $40-75K	-0.0390	-0.168	-0.139
	(0.161)	(0.147)	(0.142)
Annual Income: $75-150K	0.294	0.0886	0.0164
	(0.224)	(0.164)	(0.158)
Annual Income: >$150K	0.297	-0.176	-0.135
	(0.277)	(0.192)	(0.192)
Age Group: 40-59	-0.639*	-0.0281	0.114
	(0.287)	(0.177)	(0.165)
Age Group: 60-69	-0.924**	-0.0273	0.146
	(0.285)	(0.191)	(0.194)
Age Groups: 70-95	-0.530++	-0.0911	0.0751
	(0.312)	(0.206)	(0.195)
Region: South	0.00764	0.0880	0.0213
	(0.370)	(0.257)	(0.247)
Region: Midwest	-0.262	-0.187	-0.234
	(0.231)	(0.157)	(0.155)
Region: West	-0.603*	-0.347*	-0.121
	(0.254)	(0.153)	(0.156)
Visited Israel: Once		1.606***	1.602***
		(0.124)	(0.124)
Visited Israel: > Once		3.915***	3.709***
		(0.167)	(0.156)
Visited Israel: Lived		4.640***	4.642***
		(0.476)	(0.501)
Intermarried Parents	-3.188***	-1.569***	-1.207***
	(0.276)	(0.218)	(0.204)
Presence of Christian Congregations			0.215++
			(0.124)
Presence of Non-Christian Congregations			-0.249*
			(0.0977)
Presence of Jewish Congregations			0.0372*

			(0.0176)
Presence of Chabad Congregation			0.262++
			(0.146)
Presence of Orthodox Congregation			0.468**
			(0.165)
Presence of Conservative Congregation			0.505*
			(0.199)
Presence of Reform Congregation			0.0125
			(0.406)
Presence of Reconstructionist Congregation			0.245
			(0.516)
Presence of Jewish schools and camps			0.0172*
			(0.00724)
Presence of JCC, Federation, Philanthropies			-0.0422
			(0.0532)
Constant	10.63***	8.839***	7.504***
	(0.299)	(0.216)	(0.694)
Observations	4,880	4,880	4,281
R-squared	0.154	0.442	0.461

References

"A Portrait of Jewish Americans." 2013. Pew Research Centers Religion Public Life Project RSS. Retrieved on May 1, 2014. http://www.pewforum.org/2013/10/01/jewish-american-beliefs-attitudes-culture-survey/.

Amyot, Robert P. and Lee Sigelman. " Jews without Judaism? Assimilation and Jewish Identity in the United States." Social Science Quarterly 77(1): 177-189. Retrieved from University of Texas Press on February 1, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42863438

Borstelmann, Thomas. The 1970s: a new global history from civil rights to economic inequality. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Briggs, Kenneth A. "Reform Leader Cautions Jews on Israeli Ties." New York Times (1923-Current File), Dec 05, 1982. http://ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/122067529?accountid=7118.

Chaves, Mark. 2011. "American Religion: Contemporary Trends." Princeton University Press, pages 14, 50-51.

Chopra, Prashant, Natalie Guy, Gideon Katz, Tiffany Massa, Sheila Ochotorena, Mustafa Soylemez, et. al. 2003. Manischewitz. NYU Stern School of Business, MKT03-01. New York City, NY: Stern School of Business.

Diamond, Etan . 2002 "The Kosher Lifestyle: Religious Consumerism and Suburban Orthodox Jews." Journal of Urban History 28(288):488-505. Retrieved from Sage Pub on Dec 1, 2014

Ferziger, Adam S. "Jewish Peoplehood and Jewish Denominations." In Jewish Denominations: Addressing the Challenges of Modernity. Jerusalem: The Florence Melton Adult Mini-School, 2012. 187-227.

Goffman, Erving. The presentation of self in everyday life. New York [N.Y.: Doubleday, 1990-1959.

Gordis, Daniel. 2014. "Conservative Observance, Then and Now: A fateful difference over three decades exposes the fault line." *Commentary,* March 2014, pp. 26-30.

Hay, Carolyn. "Women on the Move: Parley to Study Jewish Identity." The Pittsburgh Press, October 2, 1970, 87 edition. http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=djft3U1LymYC&dat=19701002&printsec=frontpage&hl=en (accessed April 14, 2014).

Hofferth, Sandra L. and John Iceland 1998. Social Capital in Rural and Urban Communities. Rural Sociology, 63: 574–598.

Hyer, Marjorie . "Reform, Conservative Jews Share Common Concerns." The Washington Post, Times Herald (Washington DC), November 16, 1973.

Kashima Yoshihisa, Teruyoshi Kokubo, Emiko S. Kashima, Dianne Boxall, Susumu Yamaguchi and Kristina Macrae. 2003. "Culture and Self: Are There Within-Culture Differences in Self Between Metropolitan Areas and Regional Cities?" Personality And Social Psychology Bulletin 31(7): 1005-1012.

O'Neill, Alison. "Aliyah: Going to Live in Israel." The Washington Post (1974-Current File),Aug 07, 1980. http://ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/147185508?accountid=7118.

Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project. 2012. 'Nones' on the Rise. Retrieved 24 April 2015 http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/.

Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project. n.d. Religious Landscape Project. Retrieved 18 April 2015 (http://religions.pewforum.org/reports).

Prell, Riv-Ellen. "Jewish Summer Camping and Civil Rights: How Summer Camps Launched a Transformation in American Jewish Culture." Berman Jewish Policy Archive 2 (0): 1-40. BJPA. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.

Putnam, Robert D. 2000. "Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community." Simon & Schuster.

Roth, Laurence . 2010 "Toward a Kashrut nation in American Jewish cookbooks 1990-2000." An interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 28(2):65-91. Retrieved from UT library on Dec 1, 2014

Sands, Roberta G., Steven C. Marcus, and Rivka A. Danzig. 2006. 'The Direction of Denominational Switching in Judaism.' Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 45. Retrieved 24 April 2015 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/3838295).

Sarna, Jonathan. "The Great American Jewish Awakening." A Monthly Jewish Review 28, no. 8 (1982): 31-34.

Schulman, Bruce J. The seventies: the great shift in American culture, society, and politics. Cambridge, MA.: Da Capo Press, 2002.

Ukeles, Jacob B. . 2012. A Tale of Four Cities: Learning About Jewish Community. General Assembly in Baltimore, MD. Retrieved 10 November 2014 (http://www.jewishdatabank.org/Studies/downloadFile.cfm?FileID=2867).

Waxman, Chaim I. "The Fourth Generation Grows up: The Contemporary American Jewish Community." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

Science: America as a Multicultural Society 454 (1981): 70-85. Retrieved April 13, 2014 http://www.jstor.org/stable/1044246.

Wilkinson, K. P. 1972. A field theory perspective for community development re-search. Rural Sociology. 37:43-52.